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Abstract 
A great deal of research has been conducted on fear of crime (FoC) over last six decades.  Most of 
this inquiry has, however, focused on the study of FoC among the general public, as such, much less 
is known about the nature and impact of this fear upon immigrants. For decades in the UK, the 
subject of immigration has continually divided public opinion, a fact that the tabloid media and the 
political-right have sought to capitalize upon through the use of sensationalist anti-immigration 
rhetoric. Based upon the accounts of twelve A2 and A8 European migrants, this study assesses the 
effect that anti-immigration media and political rhetoric has on Eastern-EuƌopeaŶ ŵigƌaŶts͛ feaƌ of 
crime and the factors that aggravate and mitigate its impact.  
A key finding of the study was that the majority of participants were not fearful of crime at all and 
did not believe that a risk of harm is exacerbated by hostile media or political rhetoric. For those 
who were fearful of crime, however, it was the experience of previous victimization that was most 
related to their fears. For these participants, hostile rhetoric was more threatening though not the 
main basis of their fears. For the majority of the participants, there were a number of mitigating (or 
protective) factors in their FoC, such as, their own understanding of their ethnicity, their English 
proficiency, the demographic of their local area, and their detachment from the groups that they 
saw as the target of the rhetoric. The study concludes that the rhetoric-FoC nexus is not linear and is 
suďjeĐt to a ŵultitude of iŶdiǀidual aŶd eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal faĐtoƌs that iŶfoƌŵ ŵigƌaŶts͛ peƌĐeptioŶs of 
vulnerability, experience of FoC and the perceived aggravating role of rhetoric.    
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1. Introduction 
For decades, public opinion in the UK about the scale and nature of immigration has been 
ĐhaƌaĐteƌized ďǇ ĐautioŶ aŶd ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ;O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϬϵ; MĐLaƌeŶ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. IŶ ϮϬϬϰ, ǁheŶ the UK 
opened its borders to migrant workers from the newly ascended A8 EU member states, very 
few could have predicted what would follow. Original predictions of 5000 – 13,000 migrants 
workers would turn out to be inaccurate, as over 1 million A8 migrant workers headed for 
the UK (Light and Young, 2009; Fox, Morosanu & Szilosy, 2012). It did not take long for the 
tabloid media and political right to capitalize upon the scale of UK bound A8 migration, 
ǁhiĐh ǁas ƋuiĐklǇ fƌaŵed ǁithiŶ the adǀeƌsaƌial fƌaŵeǁoƌks of ͚thƌeat, ĐoŵpetitioŶ aŶd 
economic burden (Light & Young, 2009, Fox, Morosanu & Szilosy, 2012; Lesinka, 2014). In 
2007, the EU continued its eastward expansion by incorporating the A2 states; Romania and 
Bulgaria, however, due to anxieties over the scale of previous A8 migration, A2 migrants 
were subject to a number of labour market restrictions (Sommerville, 2007; Fox, Morosanu 
& Szilossy, 2012). As with the A8 migration, it was not long before the tabloids were awash 
with scare stories designed to inflame public opinion by problematizing and demonizing 
prospective migrants from the A2 states. It was here that the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) began to rise to the forefront of British politics with their brand 
of anti-EU and anti-immigration rhetoric that appeared to synthesize perfectly with the 
concerns of the taďloids aŶd the ͚left ďehiŶd͛ ǁhite ǁoƌkiŶg Đlass puďliĐ ;Foƌd & GoodǁiŶ, 
2014).   
 
AĐĐoƌdiŶg to Fƌost ;ϮϬϬϳͿ aŶd O͛NioŶs ;ϮϬϬϵͿ, the iŶflaŵŵatoƌǇ Ŷatuƌe of these kiŶds of 
rhetoric (media and political), which demonized and highlighted the presence of migrant 
groups, are problematic as they serve to stir up resentment towards and even legitimize 
aggƌessiǀe ƌaĐisŵ agaiŶst ŵigƌaŶt aŶd ŵiŶoƌitǇ gƌoups fƌoŵ ǁithiŶ seĐtioŶs of the ͚ǁhite 
ǁoƌkiŶg Đlasses͛. IŶ soŵe Đases, the pƌopagatioŶ of these ͚thƌeat͛ Ŷaƌƌatiǀes haǀe eǀeŶ ďeeŶ 
linked to the incitement and occurrence of targeted harassment and violence against 
ŵeŵďeƌs of the gƌoups theǇ ǀilifǇ ;‘efugee aĐtioŶ, ϮϬϬϮ; Fƌost, ϮϬϬϳ; O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϬϵ; Bakeƌ, 
Madoc-Jones, Parry, Warren, Perry Roscoe & Mottershead, 2012). In others, the disparaging 
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rhetoric contained in media and political narratives has been linked to increased 
perceptions of vulnerability among members of targeted groups (ICAR, 2004). After their 
unanticipated success at the 2014 EU election, UKIP set about their 2015 General Election 
campaign with the aim of galvanizing latent public support in the hope of cementing their 
positioŶ ǁithiŶ Bƌitish politiĐs. This ĐaŵpaigŶ ǁas laƌgelǇ ĐhaƌaĐteƌized ďǇ UKIP͛s ǁeightǇ 
criticism of the EuropeaŶ UŶioŶ aŶd the UK͛s positioŶ ǁithiŶ it. IŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, this ĐaŵpaigŶ 
focused largely upon the vivid problematization and demonization of UK-bound migrants 
from the A8 and A2 EU member states, with particular emphasis on broadly portraying 
these groups through the lenses of endemic criminality, state burden and unwanted 
competition for jobs and resources for the struggling British working classes. Thus, it is then 
entirely possible that, due to nature and prevalence of this rhetoric and the apparent 
growing base of public support for UKIP and their narratives, A2 and A8 migrants might 
experience fears and concerns about their safety and position within the UK during the 
build-up to the May 2015 election. 
 
It is against this backdrop of xenophobic rhetoric, and that of an eastward expanding EU, 
that the purpose of this study is formed; this study will seek to assess and explore the 
potential impact that mounting anti-migrant rhetoric from within mainstream media and 
political discourse has on members of targeted ŵigƌaŶt gƌoups͛ peƌĐeptioŶs of feaƌ of Đƌiŵe 
(FoC).  
The structure of this study is as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 - Literature review; will contain a review and discussion of the theoretical and 
contextual components of the study, such as, fear of crime and fear of crime among migrant 
and minority groups, as well as literature concerning the role that the media and politicians 
have in shaping public discourse and attitudes concerning immigration.   
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Chapter 3 – Methodology will contain; will detail the methodological considerations taken 
during the undertaking of this study, including the theoretical approach, sampling method, 
method of data analysis and limitation of this approach. 
 
Chapter 4 – Findings and data analysis will contain; an analysis of the data collected from 
participants and present the main findings derived from the analysis process.   
 
Chapter 5 - Discussion of findings will contain; A discussion of the factors that interact with, 
ŵitigate aŶd aggƌaǀate paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐes of feaƌ of Đƌime, how these factors 
interlink with media and political rhetoric and how these factors might be understood 
through and relate to the existing body of literature. 
 
Chapter 6 - Conclusion will contain; a concluding discussion of the main findings of this 
study, a discussion of the limitations of the current study, and possibilities for future 
research in this field.  
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2. Literature review  
This Đhapteƌ ǁill ĐoŶsideƌ a ǀaƌietǇ of liteƌatuƌe ƌeleǀaŶt to this studǇ͛s pƌiŵaƌǇ oďjeĐtiǀe; 
concerning FoC, how disparaging contemporary political and media discourse regarding 
Eastern European immigration affects the lives of migrants from those countries living in the 
UK. This chapter will consist of literature concerned with: fear of crime (FoC), FoC among 
minority groups, discrimination and hate crime, the role of the media, and the 
problematisation of migrants in the arena of contemporary politics.   
 
2.1 Fear of crime  
Eǀeƌ siŶĐe ƌeseaƌĐh iŶto ͞feaƌ of Đƌiŵe͟ ďegaŶ iŶ the ϭϵϲϬs, FoC has commanded a 
considerable deal of attention in politics and academia, becoming one of the most 
researched and politically charged topics in international criminology of the 20th century 
(Jackson, 2006; Lee, 2007; Semmens, 2007; Sutton, Robinson & Farrall, 2011; Abdullah, 
Salleh & Sakip, 2012). FoC is a form of indirect victimization which can cause victims to 
display and experience a variety of psychological disorders which can have a substantive 
effect on their quality of life such as; intense feelings of discomfort and diminished faith in 
society and the rule of law which can lead to the perception of reduced opportunities for 
free movement, recreation and sociability (Moeller, 1989). These symptoms represent a 
ŵaŶifestatioŶ of the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s peƌĐeiǀed ǀulnerability to potential victimisation from external 
threat (Abdullah et al, 2012). FoC can cause victims to hyper inflate the perceived 
importance of self-preservation which can lead to precautious behaviour such as carrying 
weapons, joining and/or commuting in gangs, and increasing spending on home security 
such as CCTV; all of which further reduce the quality of life of the victim/s and those who 
live within the immediate area (Abdullah, et al, 2012; Baron, 2011).  
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The effects and implications of FoC are far reaching and numerous, often extending beyond 
the personal anxiety experienced by the primary victim (Box, Hale & Andrews, 1988). In 
some instances FoC has been implicated as a contributory mechanism for a number of wider 
social issues such as, the erosion of neighbourhood and community cohesion (Bannister & 
Fyfe, 2001; Jackson, 2006), the outward migration of prosperous individuals from the 
community (Hale, 1996, Skogan, 1986), and increased public support for more retributive 
forms of punishment for offenders; a kneejerk reaction which often largely ignores the 
importance of addressing the underlying causes of crime (Langworthy & Whitehead, 1985; 
Jackson, 2006).  
 
2.2 Measuring fear of crime 
According to commentators, the study of FoC has long been mired by a number of 
methodological, conceptual and operational inadequacies and inconsistencies (Farrall, 
Bannister, Ditton & Gilchrist, 1997; Warr, 2000; Jackson, 2004; Semmens, 2007; Hinkle & 
Weisburg, 2008; Alper & Chappell, 2012).  
 
Like many other social phenomena, the study of FoC has for years been inundated with 
quantitative studies, largely composed of surveys and questionnaires, which seek to 
quantify social phenomena into a measurable data set (Hale, 1996). Quantitative research, 
as noted by David and Sutton (2004), assumes that social phenomena are objective in 
nature, ergo these soĐial iŶteƌaĐtioŶs haǀe a fiǆed ǀalue ƌegaƌdless of the aĐtoƌ͛s 
interpretation. In this regard, quantitative research dismisses the significance of social 
interactions to the iŶdiǀidual aŶd atteŵpts to uŶĐoǀeƌ the ͞ďig piĐtuƌe͟ ;Daǀid & “uttoŶ, 
ϮϬϬϰͿ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, as ǁe ǁill see, iŶ the studǇ of FoC this ͞ďig piĐtuƌe͟ has ďeeŶ distoƌted ďǇ a 
number of conceptual and operationalization issues.  
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The application of quantitative methods and instruments in the study of FoC present an 
issue of contention for some, who question their usefulness for interpreting and giving 
meaning complex and data rich social phenomena (Semmens, 2007; Farrall and Gadd, 2004; 
Bryman, 2012), whilst questions about the value of reducing the deep and rich latent 
meanings of subjective social phenomena to a set of quantifiable data also arise (Bryman, 
1984). As Farrall and Gadd (2004) note, the wide spread use of quantitative research 
instruments in this field of study has prompted some commentators to simultaneously 
question the validity of such methods, the data they produce and their subsequent findings. 
Subsequently Farrall and Gadd (2004) concluded that previous quantitative survey based 
studies have both largely exaggerated the prevalence and intensity of FoC among the 
general population, as well as having under-evaluated the efficacy of fear reduction 
interventions.  
 
As Semmens (2007) notes, before embarking upon research into the phenomena of FoC it is 
important to recognise that our contemporary understanding of this phenomena is laced 
with conceptual inadequacies and imperfections. In particular a number of academics have 
noted the ambiguity of the FoC as a concept which has led to the emergence of conceptual 
and methodological inconsistencies across a number of studies which have seen emotional 
͞FoC͟ ƌegulaƌlǇ ĐoŶflated ǁith otheƌ ƌelated Ǉet distiŶĐt ĐoŶĐepts suĐh as peƌĐeiǀed ƌisk, 
safety and vulnerability (Farrall, Bannister, Ditton & Gilchrist, 1997; Warr, 2000; Semmens, 
2007; Hinkle, 2014). Hinkle (2014) suggests that such a conflation of concepts has a 
tendency to yield biased and inaccurate results regarding the frequency and scale of what is 
presented as FoC but is in actual fact something else entirely. This, Hinkle (2014) claims, 
could explain the disparities and inconsistencies that are found within the existing body of 
FoC literature. Similarly Warr (2000) also suggests that the inability of academics and 
researchers to universally identify and dichotomise these intrinsically distinct concepts has 
ĐoŶtƌiďuted sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ to ĐoŶĐeptual issues of uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg aŶd ŵeasuƌiŶg ͞feaƌ͟. 
Further, Semmens (2007) argues that, despite its contemporary political and academic 
significance, the phenomena of FoC is underdeveloped at a conceptual level, pointing to a 
poor academic comprehension of fear as an emotional state and the use of flawed and 
inappropriate quantitative instruments, among others. Rader (2004) has even gone as far as 
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to suggest the complete reconceptualization of FoC in order to maintain the integrity of 
further study of this phenomena.   
 
Hinkle and Weisburd (2008) have expressed similar views regarding the importance of 
separating emotional fear from the concepts of perceived likelihood of victimisation and 
perceived risk when measuring FoC due to the pervasive nature of these concepts and the 
subjectivity of the responses they induce from one individual to the next. For example, 
some people may perceive a high risk of crime in their everyday routines but continue to 
their lives as normal, however someone else living in the same area may be incapacitated by 
feelings of fear which are induced by the same perceived risk. Meithe and Lee (1984) 
suggest that a considerable number of studies have failed to operationalize fear in relation 
to how it manifests itself in response to varied crime cues among different respondents. 
Such failings, according to Meithe and Lee (1984), can and have undermined the integrity of 
such studies in that they overlook and fail to recognise the value of crime specific fears.  
 
In light of the many criticisms levelled at FoC literature, Farrall, Bannister, Ditton and 
Gilchrist (1997) conducted a methodological study of FoC in which they utilized both 
quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews in order to identify and control for the 
shortcomings of the former approach. Their results identified a number of weaknesses in 
quantitative FoC literature; firstly, feelings of anger were found to be a much more common 
response to the hypothetical prospect of victimisation and that such responses were not 
traced by survey instruments. Secondly the study revealed a number of mismatches 
ďetǁeeŶ paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ ƌespoŶses at the qualitative and quantitative level which, according to 
Farrall, Bannister, Ditton and Gilchrist (1997), further highlights a number of methodological 
and conceptual issues which are linked to the use survey measures of FoC.  Additionally, a 
great deal of criticism has been aimed at the wording and design of survey questions and 
the predetermined answers they often elicit, however, the scope of this review prevents a 
thorough account of such criticisms (Farrall, Bannister, Ditton & Gilchrist, 1997; Semmens, 
2007; Farrall & Gadd, 2004; Warr, 2000; Gray, Jackson & Farrall, 2008).      
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As briefly evidenced above, the study of FoC is one that has become mired by a myriad of 
methodological, conceptual and operationalization issues and shortcomings that some 
scholars (as above) would argue undermine the validity of established knowledge in this 
field. However, the literature also argues that the majority of these shortcomings are 
confined and related to quantitative research studies which seek to quantify social 
phenomena into a measurable data set.  
 
For the purpose of this study, FoC is defined as a response, which may be psychological or 
behavioural, which is produced by the perceived threat of crime, verbal or physical, which 
iŵpaiƌs the affeĐted iŶdiǀiduals͛ ĐapaĐitǇ to fuŶĐtioŶ as theǇ ŶoƌŵallǇ ǁould ǁithiŶ theiƌ 
daily lives. 
 
2.3 Explanatory models for fear of crime 
Because of its pervasive nature and potential for political manipulation, interest in FoC has 
fuelled a substantial body of research in this field. From this body of research a variety of 
explanatory models on the factors related to FoC have emerged, a number of which are 
considered in the section bellow, starting with the vulnerability model.    
 
The Vulnerability model 
This model stipulates that FoC will be most acute among the most vulnerable groups of 
society; those most at risk, least capable of defending themselves or recovering from a 
potential attack, such as women, the elderly and the poor (Hale, 1996; Pantazis, 2000; Alper 
and Chappell, 2012). However, paradoxically, research suggests that the group statistically 
most likely to be victimised, adolescent males, actually experience the least FoC (Box, Hale, 
Andrews, 1988; Weinrather & Gartell, 1996; Scarborough, Like-Haislip, Novak, Lucas & 
Alarid, 2010; Backson, 2006; Snedker, 2012; Hinkle 2014). One theory for such a paradox 
points to the salience of potential risk factors (Scarborough et al, 2010). For example, the 
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serious and long lasting implications of rape are likely to contribute to elevated FoC among 
women, whilst a sense of hyper masculinity may play a role in male underreporting of FoC 
(Hale, 1996; Stanko & Hobdell, 1993; Sutton, Robinson and Farrall, 2011). 
 
The Victimisation model 
The victimisation model maintains that direct or indirect experiences of crime are directly 
linked to FoC (Hale, 1996). As such, this theory is underpinned by the assumption that those 
who experience crime in some form will also experience heightened FoC. However, 
evidence for this effect is inconsistent and inconclusive (Hale, 1996; Weinrath and Gartell, 
1996; Evans and Fletcher, 2000; Banister and Fyfe, 2001). Similarly, some evidence also 
suggests that indirect victimisation, conveyed through second-hand sources such as gossip 
and the media, is more influential than direct victimisation (Box, Hale and Andrews, 1988; 
Roccato, Russo and Vieno, 2011). For example, the media plays a primary role in the 
conveying of second-hand accounts and information about crime to its viewers/consumers. 
However, given the importance of media values, such as that of sensationalism being a key 
driver in sales, these media sources have something of a vested interest in the over-
reporting, exaggeration and even fabrication of the nature and prevalence of crime, thus 
contributing to FoC that is generally disproportionate to the actual threat (Hale, 1996, 
Chadee, 2001; Callanan, 2012; Jewkes, 2008). Considering the paradox of heightened public 
FoC, despite the number of police reported crime rates falling year on year, the importance 
of the media and sensationalist reporting in this regard seems quite logical, however, 
evidence for such a link has yielded mixed results (Callanan, 2012; Chedee & Ditton, 2005). 
 
The Environmental model 
This model proposes that environmental factors, both social and physical, contribute 
towards FoC (Hale, 1996; Brown, Brown and Perkins, 2004; Foster, Giles-Corti & Knuiman, 
2010; Austin, Furr and Spine, 2002). There are three key components to this model; 
urbanism, community and incivilities however the scope of this review prevents a detailed 
discussion. Central to this model are the concepts of community cohesion and social order, 
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in short, the homogeneity of the population (DeLone, 2008). Evidence suggests that persons 
living in heavily urbanised areas, where it is theorized that homogeneity is reduced due to 
transient populations, experience FoC to a higher degree than those who live in rural areas 
which feature more permanent and homogenous populations (Hale, 1996; Brown, Brown 
and Perkins, 2008; Brunton-Smith and Strugis; DeLone, 2008). Further, evidence suggests 
that FoC is higher in areas that experience high levels of incivilities such as graffiti, public 
drug use and gangs of young people (Brunton-Smith & Strugis, 2001; Hinkle & Weisburd, 
2008; Brown, Brown & Perkins, 2004). 
 
The Psychological model 
This model is concerned with the psychological processes that are associated with general 
feelings of fear and vulnerability and how these relate to FoC (Hale, 1996; Jackson, 2009; 
Cops, Pleysier & Put, 2011; Chadee and Ying, 2013). It has been suggested by this model that 
feelings of general fear, which may come as a result of low self-confidence or psychological 
illness such as anxiety, are often mistaken for and recorded as FoC; a theory that might 
explain the disproportionality between FoC and levels of actual crime (Jackson, 2009; Cops, 
Pleysier and Put, 2011; Chadee and Ying, 2013). Further, Gabriel and Grieve (2003) note the 
ambiguity of fear triggers and how they may affect different people in different manners; 
some cues may allay fear in certain individuals whilst triggering dormant fears in others 
depending on the mind-set of the individual in question. In this regard Chadee and Ying 
(2013) found that general fear was a significant predictor of FoC across a number of 
variables, thus indicating the salience of subjective non-crime related fears and anxieties to 
the study of FOC.      
 
2.4 Fear of crime among migrant and minority groups 
Pervasive in nature and therefore not exclusive to any particular demographic of society, 
FoC and research concerning this phenomena has had a tendency to focus on its prevalence 
and causes within the context of the public in general, rather than particular ethnic or social 
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groups. As such, the scope of FoC research among minority and migrant groups is quite 
limited (Ackah, 2000; Wu and Wen, 2014). Further, the scope of research concerning FoC 
among the particular demographics with which this study is concerned is narrow. However, 
the current study sought to supplement this limited body of research with existing literature 
regarding FoC among other minority groups whose circumstances may be comparable. The 
following section will consider a body of literature related to FoC among migrant and 
minority groups, followed by a review of two other studies which relate to FoC among 
migrant populations (Furr, Austin, Cribbs and Smogger, 2006; Lee and Ulmer, 2006; 
Sundeen, 1984; Ackah, 2000; Eitle & Taylor, 2008; Mason, 2010; Wu and Wen, 2014). 
 
For prospective migrants, the process of moving and settling into a new country can be a 
problematic and stressful experience (Ritzner and Ponizovsky, 1999; Furr, Austin, Cribbs and 
Smoger, 2006; Fandrem, Strohmeier and Jonsdottir, 2012). Factors such as language 
barriers, lack of social support, diminished employment prospects and absence of family 
and friends can further exacerbate feelings of anxiety and discomfort which might already 
be manifested by the moving process (Lee and Ulmer, 2000; Wu and Wen, 2014). As a broad 
demographic, migrants may also find themselves exposed to a number of victimization risk 
factors including, having lower levels of education, a younger average age, lower rates of 
home ownership, an enhanced likelihood of living in high disorder neighbourhoods and lack 
of private transport (Babacan, Pyke, Bhathal, Gill, Grossman & Bertone, 2010; Wu & 
Aletheimer, 2013). Some evidence even suggests that the process of migration itself is even 
linked to mental health problems in some individuals (Ritzner & Ponizovsky, 1999). These 
factors considered, it is almost unsurprising that research suggests that, for a variety of 
reasons, migrant and minority groups are more likely to experience more pronounced FoC 
than their indigenous counterparts and the general population as a whole (Akah, 2000; Eitle 
& Taylor, ϮϬϬϴ; Meaƌs aŶd “teǁaƌt, ϮϬϭϬ; PaiŶ, ϮϬϬϭ; O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϭϬͿ. ‘espeĐtiǀe studies iŶ 
the US concerning Ghanaian, South Korean and Hispanic migrant populations illustrate how 
concerns regarding FoC and victimization are more prevalent among these groups 
compared to the general population (Akah, 2000; Brown & Benedict, 2004; Lee & Ulmer, 
2006).  
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Hypotheses concerning migrant levels of acculturation have been considered, whereby the 
more fluent and familiar newcomers are with the language and customs of their adoptive 
country, the less they will fear victimization (Wu & Wen, 2014). However, evidence to 
support such a hypothesis has been mixed; some in favour (Sundeen, 1984; Lee & Ulmer, 
ϮϬϬϲ; Wu & WeŶ, ϮϬϭϰͿ, soŵe agaiŶst ;Yu, KeƌĐheƌ & “ǁiŶdell, ϮϬϭϬͿ. MigƌaŶts͛ length of 
stay in their adoptive country is another key acculturation factor. Research concerning this 
faĐtoƌ aŶd its pƌediĐtaďilitǇ of ŵigƌaŶts͛ FoC haǀe Ǉielded a siŵilaƌ Đohoƌt of ŵiǆed eǀideŶĐe 
for (Sundeen, 1984; Lee & Ulmer, 2000) and against (Akah, 2000; Yun, Kercher & Swindell, 
2010).  
 
One study of Chinese students in Melbourne found that first and second-hand experiences 
of ǀiĐtiŵizatioŶ aŶd haƌassŵeŶt ǁeƌe sigŶifiĐaŶt faĐtoƌs iŶ paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐe of FoC 
and perceived vulnerability (Babacan et al, 2010). Here, a number of heightened risk 
eǆposuƌe faĐtoƌs ǁeƌe ideŶtified, suĐh as paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ ƌesideŶĐe iŶ high disoƌdeƌ 
neighbourhoods, use of public transport at night and lack of local knowledge. Furthermore, 
paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ south AsiaŶ ethŶiĐity was also identified as significant risk factor due to the 
recurrent racial component of the victimization being experienced. Due to the prevalence 
and nature of this victimization, Babcan et al (2010) found that victimized and non-
victimized participants alike reported altering their routines, reclusiveness at night, 
avoidance of alcohol consumption areas and widely held perceptions of racist attitudes 
among many Anglo-Australians. As a result, the majority of participants believed Melbourne 
to be a far more dangerous place than when they had first arrived, with some victims even 
leaving the country out of fear or due to the seriousness of the psychological and physical 
trauma they had experienced. 
 
Alternatively, research from the USA found that paradoxically, whilst reporting lower levels 
of neighbourhood satisfaction, refugees from the former USSR reported higher perceptions 
of safety and security than their indigenous American counterparts (Furr, Austin, Cribbs and 
Smogger; 2006). These findings were unexpected and contradicted the previously 
established theoretical framework on which the authors had formed their hypothesis. In this 
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regard, they had predicted that refugee participants would report markedly lower 
perceptions of safety due to being unfamiliar with their new neighbourhood, local norms 
and routines, and the likelihood of being treated as outsiders by the indigenous population. 
In light of these findings, the authors hypothesised that, unlike other migrant groups, the 
former USSR participants in this study had benefitted from their refugee status, in that they 
were afforded state sponsored housing assistance which ensured they were not housed in 
tǇpiĐallǇ high Đƌiŵe ͞ethŶiĐ iŶŶeƌ-ĐitǇ eŶĐlaǀes͟. Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, the faĐt that ŵaŶǇ of the 
refugee participants had emigrated in family-units was also hypothesised to have an 
anaesthetic effect on the transitional difficulties which have been cited in previous studies. 
Furr et al (2006) also suggested that their unexpected findings might be explained by 
ƌefugee paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ of safetǇ iŶ the U“A Đoŵpaƌed to the foƌŵeƌ U““‘, due to 
the inferior living conditions and more restrictive state conditions in the USSR and better 
law enforcement in the USA.  
 
In all, evidence in this field suggests that FoC is likely to be felt more strongly by minority 
ethnic and migrant communities. Previous research has suggested and explored a range of 
factors that are thought to contribute to this phenomenon such as, adopted language 
proficiency, length of stay in adopted country, area of residency, perceptions of crime and 
faŵiliaƌitǇ ǁith the ĐƌiŵiŶal justiĐe sǇsteŵ iŶ ŵigƌaŶts͛ ĐouŶtƌies of oƌigiŶ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, the 
body of evidence here is somewhat incomplete and inconclusive, and there is little existing 
research about the relationship between the vilified status of particular migrant groups 
ǁithiŶ populaƌ Đultuƌe aŶd ŵeŵďeƌs of said gƌoups͛ peƌĐeptioŶs of FoC. DƌaǁiŶg upoŶ the 
body of existent literature, it is the researcheƌ͛s eǆpeĐtatioŶ that paƌtiĐipaŶts iŶ this studǇ 
will express a pronounced experience of FoC.    
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2.5 Hate cƌiŵe aŶd the ͞otheƌ͟ 
A vast body of literature exists regarding the nature, scale and impact of hate crime upon 
minority groups within society, however, due to this scale, a thorough appraisal of this 
literature is beyond the scope of this review. As such, the following review of hate crime 
literature will be summary.  
 
Hate crime has been ever present throughout human history, however, due to contrasting 
and ever changing global social, cultural, political and religious norms, the establishment of 
a universal consensus on this issue has been problematic (Boeckmann & Turpin-Petrosino, 
2002; Gertsenfeld, 2004; Hall, 2005; Chakraboti & Garland, 2009; Hall, 2013). Broadly 
speaking, the central component of hate crime is the hatred or bigotry of the offender 
towards the group to which their victim belongs (McDevitt, Levin, Bennett, 2002; 
Gerstenfeld, 2004; Chongatera, 2013). Petrosino (2004, pg10) offers a more extensive 
definition of hate crime, identifying three core characteristics that distinguish this type of 
crime from others: 
͞The ǀiĐtiŵ͛s gƌoups͛ affiliatioŶ ;ƌaĐial, Đultuƌal, oƌ ƌeligiousͿ, the gƌoup iŶ ƋuestioŶs͛ lesseƌ 
political and economic standing, and the manner in which the victim and their affiliated 
gƌoup ƌepƌeseŶt a thƌeat to the peƌpetƌatoƌs͛ ƋualitǇ of life͟.  
 
This kind of crime is distinct in that it has a clear symbolic function intended to convey a 
message of hate to the victim͛s eŶtiƌe gƌoup ;Cƌaig, ϮϬϬϮ; GeƌsteŶfeld, ϮϬϬϰͿ. Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, 
hate Đƌiŵes also seƌǀe aŶ iŶstƌuŵeŶtal fuŶĐtioŶ, iŶ that ŵeŵďeƌs of ǀiĐtiŵs͛ affiliated gƌoup 
may be inclined to change and adapt their normal routines in order to avoid becoming a 
victim themselves (Craig, 2002; Chongatera, 2013). It is argued by some that victims of this 
type of crime can suffer from more pronounced physical, psychological and emotional 
trauma than the victims of similar, non-hate related offenses (Levin & McDevitt, 1992; Craig, 
2002; Harek, Cogan & Gillis, 2002; Gertsenfeld, 2004; Perry, 2010).  
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Official figures concerning the prevalence of these hate crimes in England and Wales are 
imprecise (Hall, 2013), with Official Home Office figures (42,236) and those of the British 
Crime Survey (278,000) for hate crime offences varying considerably for the period of 
2012/13 (ONS, 2013; Home Office, 2014). In both sets of figures are consistent in identifying 
the ǀiĐtiŵ͛s ƌaĐe as the pƌiŵaƌǇ ŵotiǀatioŶ foƌ the offeŶĐe. Foƌ the ŵost paƌt, previous 
literature has identified race and ethnicity as being central determinants of the hate crime 
experience, with persons of African heritage having the most pronounced experience and 
fear of experiencing hate crime, even when compared to other visible ethnic minorities 
(Benia, Janhevich & Hastings, 2008; Chongatera; 2013). Evidence also indicates that first-
hand experience of hate crime is directly linked to heightened perceptions of vulnerability 
to and fear of hate crime (Herek, Gillis & Cogan, 1999; Benia, Janhevich & Hastings, 2013). 
Recent evidence from the UK, however, indicates that hate crime is becoming a more 
common experience for non-ǀisiďle ŵiŶoƌities ;O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϭϬͿ, ǁheƌeďǇ ƌeĐoƌded hate 
motivated violence against Eastern-European migrants are not uncommon (Mason, 2005; 
Human Rights First, 2008; Baker et al, 2012; Belfast Interface Project, 2013). Qualitative data 
her indicates that the animosity experienced by Eastern-European migrants may be due to 
the stigma that has been attached to these groups within the media and wider public 
discourse (Baker et al, 2012).  
 
Fundamentally, these findings indicate something of a paradigm widening that not only 
iŶĐoƌpoƌates ͚tƌaditioŶal͛ ǀiĐtiŵs of hate Đƌiŵe, ďut also ethŶiĐallǇ hoŵogeŶous gƌoups that 
are perceived to represent competition for resources, criminality or economic threat (Frost, 
ϮϬϬϳ; HuŵaŶ ‘ights Fiƌst, ϮϬϬϴ; O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϭϬ; Bakeƌ et al, ϮϬϭϮͿ. The ƌeasoŶ foƌ this, 
according to Sivanandan (2001) may be due to the deterrence based immigration and 
asylum policies of previous UK governments and the messages of external threat and 
burden that were communicated to the wider public through these policies. As such, the 
Đƌiteƌia foƌ this ͚ǆeŶo-ƌaĐisŵ͛ is Ŷot ethŶiĐitǇ ďut ƌatheƌ the perceived relative economic 
standing of newcomers. Here, Sivanandan (2001) equates poverty to being the modern 
eƋuiǀaleŶt of ͚ďlaĐkŶess͛ as a souƌĐe of deŵoŶizatioŶ, disĐƌiŵiŶatioŶ aŶd soĐial eǆĐlusioŶ. IŶ 
considering the nature and reason for this paradigm shift, a number of commentators have 
underlined the possible significance of historical and contemporary political and media 
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discourse as a source perceived tension between the white working/underclasses and 
prospective newcomers (Frost, 2007; McLaren & Johnson, 2007; Human Rights First, 2008; 
O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϬϴ; LesiŶka, ϮϬϭϰͿ.  
 
To summarise, hate crime represents an assertion of dominance of one group in society 
over another, whereby marginal groups are deemed to threaten the position of the 
dominant group. Evidence suggests that those who feel most threatened by migrant inflows 
are typically from the working and underclasses. It is possible that, due to their already 
limited power and social standing, these groups are also most likely to resort to crude 
retaliation, such as hate crimes, in order to maintain and reassert their position. Race has 
been identified as major determinants of experiencing hate crime, however recent evidence 
indicates that white European migrants are now also experiencing hate crime in the UK. This 
shift, according to commentators and victims alike, may be attributable to the 
problematizing way in which these groups are portrayed to the wider public within political 
and media discourse.    
 
2.6 The role of the media and fear of crime 
As a mode of communication, the media has the potential to greatly shape and influence its 
audieŶĐes͛ peƌĐeptioŶs of loĐal oƌ ǁoƌld eǀeŶts, ƋuestioŶs of ĐausatioŶs aŶd attƌiďutioŶ of 
blame (Miller & Phillo, 1999). For example, Moore (2014) highlights the way in which the US 
publics support for the Iraq war was influenced by the media and its noncritical adoption 
and proliferation of the US government͛s narrative which linked Saddam Hussain and Iraq to 
9/11 and al-Qaeda. The attitude of the UK mainstream media towards migrants and asylum 
seekeƌs is oŶe tǇpified ďǇ outǁaƌd hostilitǇ aŶd pƌoďleŵatizatioŶ ;O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϭϬ; Fƌost, 
2007; Human Rights First, 2008: Lesinka, 2014; Mawby and Gisby, 2009). Here, the 
distinction between asylum seekers, legitimate and illegitimate migrants has become lost in 
the ŵidst of the ŵedia͛s deŵoŶizatioŶ of aŶǇoŶe ǁho fits the ŵould of the ͞otheƌ͟, a 
disĐouƌse that fits the teŵplate of a ŵoƌal paŶiĐ ;O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϭϬ; MaǁďǇ aŶd GisďǇ, ϮϬϬϵ; 
21 
 
Philo, Briant & Donald, 2013). In particular, the actions of the tabloid press have been 
highlighted for intensifying public concerns about immigration by framing the issue as one 
of foreign invasion, economic burden, employment competition and criminality, often 
exaggerating actual events and figures in order to gain artificial validity (EUMC, 2002; Frost, 
ϮϬϬϳ; MaǁďǇ aŶd GisďǇ, ϮϬϬϵ; O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϭϬ; AlleŶ & BliŶdeƌ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. A theŵe that has 
become typical of such narratives is that of ŵigƌaŶts͛ ĐƌiŵiŶal pƌedispositioŶ, a ĐoŶflatioŶ 
that represents the merging of two divisive issues, crime and immigration, both of which are 
the source of considerable public concern (MORI, 2007; McLaren and Johnson, 2007; Banks, 
2008; Allen & Vicol, 2014). Furthermore, the media application of such a narrow thematic 
spectrum has been particularly evident in their narrative regarding the lifting of restrictions 
oŶ ‘oŵaŶiaŶ aŶd BulgaƌiaŶ ĐitizeŶs͛ ƌight to ǁoƌk iŶ the UK aŶd otheƌ EU ĐouŶtƌies. Heƌe 
Allen and Vicol (2014) found that the overwhelming majority of tabloid media coverage 
around the imminent lifting of work restrictions focused on Romanian and Bulgarian 
ĐitizeŶs͛ appaƌeŶt pƌopeŶsitǇ foƌ ĐƌiŵiŶal gaŶg Đultuƌe, aŶti-social behaviour, as well as theft 
and begging behaviour, among other forms of dishonesty. In this regard, Mawby and Gisby 
(2009) argue that the manner in which some sections of the media construct and report the 
anticipated arrival of migrant newcomers fits the framework of a moral panic.  
 
Moral Panics 
According to Cohen (2002) a typical moral panic consists of five distinct elements; 1) 
concern about a potential or imagined threat; 2) opposition and moral outrage toward 
those who embody the perceived threat (Folk devils) and the authorities responsible for 
dealing with them; 3) general consensus of the existence of a threat and the need to 
address it; 4) disproportionate exaggeration of the scale of the perceived problem, its 
severity and its dormant potential to cause harm; and 5) an unanticipated sudden eruption 
of panic and outrage that quickly dissipates. Here, some contend that the ascension of 
Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union fits the criteria of a modern moral panic, 
whereby Bulgarians and Romanians are portrayed as an imminent threat to the social 
values, stretched resources and opportunities of the indigenous populations of more 
affluent Western European nations (Mawby and Gisby, 2009). As such, these migrants are 
esseŶtiallǇ ĐoŶstƌuĐted as folk deǀils ďǇ the ŵedia; aŶ eǆteƌŶal ͞otheƌ͟ onto whom 
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sweeping generalizations and labels can be broadly applied (Cohen, 2002; Mawby & Gisby, 
2009). In this case, the moral concern stems from the generalized depiction of Bulgaria and 
Romania as being poverty stricken countries, where organised criminality is a way of life. 
These ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aŶd steƌeotǇpes aƌe theŶ ƌeĐipƌoĐated aŶd ĐoŶfiƌŵed ďǇ ͞eǆpeƌts͟ aŶd 
moral entrepreneurs, such as opportunistic politicians and experts whose views fit the 
media narrative, which further perpetuates public concern and its demands for appropriate 
action. Appropriate action in this case came in the form of the UK government announcing 
that it would be restricting migration from Romania and Bulgaria through the 
implementation of a screening process as opposed to the usual free movement afforded to 
citizens of EU member states. Here, Mawby and Gisby (2009) underline the role of the 
media as being the central mechanism in the propagation of this particular moral panic.  
Cohen (2002), however, argues that the discourse surrounding immigration and asylum 
issues does not constitute moral panic status, due to the consistency and longevity with 
which these concerns have remained embedded throughout past and current discourse and 
the extent to which these issues are global. Mawby and Gisby (2009) similarly argue that 
this particular episode of panic is but one such event in a series of many long standing 
panics, regarding the enlargement of the European Union and waves of migration from 
around the globe.  
 
Miller and Philo (1999) acknowledge the huge capacity of the media to raise awareness 
about issues, however, they also note that this is not necessarily done through an honest 
representation of these often complicated issues. This analysis appears to correspond with 
O͛NioŶs ;ϮϬϭϬͿ aŶd MaǁďǇ aŶd GisďǇ͛s ;ϮϬϬϵͿ assessŵeŶt of the ŵedia/iŵŵigƌatioŶ Ŷeǆus; 
distinctions between specific groups, issues and the facts surrounding them are often 
neglected, leaving a simplified, often unbalanced narrative of the issues at hand. It is in this 
context that Hall (1981) considers the relationship between public receptors and the media, 
and the influence that each has on the other. He notes the pervasiveness of 
͞ĐoŵŵoŶseŶsiĐal͟ passiǀe ƌaĐisŵ ǁith iŶ soŵe ǁalks of hegeŵoŶiĐ white society and that 
this ͞ĐoŵŵoŶ seŶse͟ ƌaĐisŵ has ďeĐoŵe the pƌeseƌǀe of the ŵedia; a soƌt of ďipolaƌ 
relationship between the two whereby one maintains and perpetuates the other and vice 
versa. Here, Philo (1999) claims that the media reflects and promotes the political agendas 
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of the day and highlights the importance of government policies and discussion regarding 
immigration as potential media narrative setters. In this regard, a connection between 
media trends and political narrative is inferred.  
 
In considering the mechanisms of the media and how these influence public attitudes 
toǁaƌds ͞otheƌs͟, FiŶŶeǇ aŶd PeaĐh ;ϮϬϬϰͿ aĐkŶoǁledge a Ŷuŵďeƌ of faĐtoƌs that aƌe 
believed to be important in determining attitudinal responses to media representations of 
͞otheƌs͟, suĐh as the peƌĐeiǀed pƌestige of the ŵedia souƌĐe iŶ ƋuestioŶ, the attitude of the 
reader and bias toward the information being disseminated. Hall (1980) also hypothesises 
that the process through which media messages are transferred to and digested by 
audiences is one characterised by the encoding and decoding of information when it is 
communicated and received. Here, Hall (1980) claims that media messages are best 
received, understood and accepted by the receptor when that message is coded within a 
prevailing or favoured code. Such a hypothesis draws parallels with the previously discussed 
analysis of the media/immigration nexus, whereby commonsensical racism represents a 
pƌeǀailiŶg/faǀouƌed ͞Đode͟ ǁithiŶ ĐeƌtaiŶ seĐtioŶs of soĐietǇ. These Đodes are both 
reciprocated and repeated from sections of the media, confirming and reinforcing existing 
perceptions and completing a self-perpetuating cycle. However, according to Kitzinger 
(1999) the reception of media discourses does not always follow the aforementioned cycle, 
whereby ͞audieŶĐe ƌesistaŶĐe͟ tools, suĐh as logiĐ, distƌust of the ŵedia aŶd peƌsoŶal 
experience are potential buffers to this cycle. Kitzinger (1999) also cautions that these 
͞ƌesistaŶĐe͟ faĐtoƌs do Ŷot alǁaǇs pƌeǀeŶt audieŶĐes fƌoŵ accepting media messages 
because their personal experiences and logic may be called into question when challenged 
by prevailing narratives that are presented as being based on factual data and expertise.  
 
As a tool of mass communication, the media possesses a certain degree of agenda setting 
potential which, according to some, becomes greatly enhanced during times of social and 
economic hardship, such as those that followed the recent economic crisis of 2007 (Cohen, 
2002). It is within the environment of uncertainty and austerity which followed that the 
tabloid anti-immigration agenda has become more thoroughly entrenched within the wider 
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public consciousness (Zick, Pettigrew & Wagner, 2008; Philo, Briant & Donald, 2013). Here, 
evidence appears to suggest that public perceptions and impressions of immigration and 
related issues draw a number of parallels with hostile narratives which are peddled by 
certain sections of the tabloid media (ICAR, 2005; Philo, Briant & Donald, 2013; Wortley, 
2009; Simon & Sikich, 2007; Sohoni & Sohoni, 2014).  
 
The ƌelatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ ŵedia ĐoŶsuŵptioŶ aŶd ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ FoC has ďeeŶ a topiĐ of 
almost constant investigation for over 40 years, resulting in over 100 studies being 
conducted (Ditton, 2008; Callanan, 2012). Despite this abundance of research literature, the 
general link between media consumption and FoC remains unclear, with some of studies 
indicating a link and others not (Surette, 1998; Weitzner and Kubris, 2004; Ditton, 2008; 
Moore, 2014; Jewkes, 2015). Within this body of literature, a number of frameworks have 
ďeeŶ deǀeloped to eǆplaiŶ hoǁ the ŵedia affeĐts ĐoŶsuŵeƌs͛ peƌĐeptioŶs of FoC ;“uƌette, 
1998; Smolej and Kivivuori, 2006; Callanan, 2012; Kohm, Waid-Lindberg, Weinrath, Shelley 
and Dobss, 2012; Callanan and Rosenberger, 2015): 
• Substitution: Persons lacking alternative sources of knowledge substitute 
media information, which raises fear. (Women, elderly, whites and non-victims) 
• Resonance: Persons with victim experience focus on media information, 
which compounds pre-existing fear. (Urban, high-crime neighbourhood residents, 
males, young, ethnic minorities) 
• Vulnerability: Persons less able to prevent victimization are made more 
fearful by media information. (Women and elderly) 
• Affinity: Persons who demographically resemble media victims are made 
more fearful by media information. (Women, Older women, ethnic minority women, 
victims) 
• Ceiling effects: Persons who already have high levels of fear are therefore 
ďeǇoŶd the ŵedia͛s iŶflueŶĐe. ;WoŵeŶ, EthŶiĐ ŵiŶoƌities)  
Fundamentally, these various frameworks propose a range of contradictory media effects 
on various audience groups and individuals in different social situations (Surette, 1998). 
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However, the central hypothesis here is that second-hand information, not first-hand 
experience of crime, increases consumer fears and perceptions of vulnerability (Kohm, 
Waid-Lindberg, Weinrath, Shelley & Dobbs, 2012). Evidence to support these frameworks 
has however, been rather varied (Ditton, Chadee, Farrall, Gilchrist and Bannister, 2002; 
Kohm et al, 2012). However, as Ditton et al (2004) note, it would be premature to dismiss 
the role of the media in shaping their audiences views about crime. Further research in this 
field has sought to identify and explore complex patterns rather than simple effects. The 
composition of these complex patterns are thus (Ditton et al, 2004); characteristics of the 
message, whereby sensational, random and local crimes are thought to be more fear-
inducing; characteristics of the audience, those with no prior experience of crime are 
thought to be more susceptible to media influence, and the type of dependant measure, 
whereby measuring fear of particular crimes, such as urban violence or rape being more 
likely to elicit media induced fear.  
 
For all the literature investigating the media-FoC ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ, to the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ͛s ďest 
knowledge there is only one study that as sought to ascertain a link between disparaging 
media representations of a minority groups aŶd ŵeŵďeƌs͛ perceptions of vulnerability and 
FoC. Here, the ICAR study (2004) sought to investigate the impact of media and, to a lesser 
extent, political images of asylum seekers and refugees within the confines of London 
boroughs. Here, evidence was found to support the hypothesis that the publication of 
inaccurate and inflammatory images of refugees and asylum seekers can influence 
misinformed and hostile views and attitudes among members of the general public. 
Furthermore, evidence also suggested that such images and the attitudes they promote can 
and do create environments in which members of targeted minority groups are more fearful 
of racially motivated attacks (ICAR, 2004). These findings appear to indicate a link between 
disparaging media narratives and FoC among targeted minority groups that fits the 
explanatory framework of affinity.   
 
The manner in which the tabloid media dehumanize migrants draws certain comparisons to 
the way in which Jews and Roma gypsies were portrayed by the Nazis in the build up to and 
during the Holocaust (Sigona & Trehan, 2011). Here, Frost (2007) suggests that the actions 
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of certain sections of the media, combined with an observant and implicit government, 
seƌǀes to aĐtiǀelǇ faĐilitate suĐh ƌaĐisŵ ǁithiŶ ĐeƌtaiŶ seĐtioŶs of the ͞ǁhite ǁoƌkiŶg Đlass͟. 
This assessŵeŶt ƌesoŶates ǁith soŵe aĐĐouŶts ƌepoƌted iŶ Gadd et al͛s ;ϮϬϬϱͿ studǇ iŶ 
North Staffordshire which cross examined the attitudes of hate crime offenders and 
͞oƌdiŶaƌǇ people͟ toǁaƌds ŵigƌaŶts aŶd ethŶiĐ ŵiŶoƌities. TheǇ fouŶd that paƌtiĐipaŶts 
expressed a number of grievances that mirrored those of the tabloid media; interviewees 
did Ŷot distiŶguish ďetǁeeŶ ŵigƌaŶt ĐlassifiĐatioŶs, theǇ eǆpƌessed aŶ ͞us͟ ǀeƌsus ͞theŵ͟ 
distiŶĐtioŶ ǁheŶ ƌefeƌƌiŶg to those ǁho ͞ďeloŶged͟ aŶd ͞alieŶ͟ ŵigƌaŶts. Fuƌtheƌ, 
accusations of institutional favouritism by service providers such as the NHS, the Police, the 
benefits system and the political elite were also notable themes that emerged, as was the 
ĐoŶĐeptual assessŵeŶt of ŵigƌaŶts͛ ĐoŶteŵpt foƌ iŶdigeŶous Đultuƌal ǀalues. These findings 
would appear to indicate a link between the objections contained within anti-immigration 
rhetoric and those expressed among the wider public to justify anti-immigration sentiments. 
Although no direct link can be drawn between the media and hate crime, the contempt 
directed toward migrants in such rhetoric can and has in the past been used by some as a 
crude justification for perpetration of hate crimes towards targeted groups (Frost, 2007; 
O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϭϬ; “igoŶa aŶd TƌehaŶ, ϮϬϭϭ; BaŶks, ϮϬ08). 
 
In summary, it is evident that the media is a tool for communicating information on a vast 
scale which has the potential to inform and shape the opinions of the general public. 
Although audiences are by no means uncritical receptors, those narratives that appeal to or 
appear to confirm already existing biases are most readily accepted. These narratives can 
become embedded within popular discourse and can become commonly accepted among 
wider audiences. With regards to anti-immigration rhetoric, it is evident that the 
aforementioned cycle is a key mechanism in the dissemination of exaggerated media 
stereotypes which generally portray migrants and asylum seekers as a threat to the 
audieŶĐes͛ wellbeing. Evidence also indicates that the suggestive power of the media can 
become amplified during times of turmoil and economic hardship. Given the recent 
economic climate and the narrow thematic framework in which the media portray migrants, 
recent migrants from Romania and Bulgaria are likely to find themselves caught up in a cycle 
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of reciprocal defamation. In the midst of this cycle, such migrants may find themselves in an 
environment where they are exposed to shaming, discrimination and even violence.  
 
2.7 Political rhetoric and immigration 
In the years preceding the Second World War, the typical stance of the British government 
toward immigration and ethnic relations was one that promoted the acceptance and 
tolerance of multiculturalism. However, during more recent times political discourse in this 
regard has begun to take an unexpected tilt toward the Powellian right of the political 
speĐtƌuŵ ;Malik, ϭϵϵϲ; IǀaƌsflateŶ, ϮϬϬϱ; MĐGhee, ϮϬϬϱ; O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϭϬ; LesiŶska, ϮϬϭϰ; 
Ford, Jennings & Sommerville, 2015).  
 
Previously an issue of little public importance, immigration concerns have become 
something of an opportunity for political parties to garner easy votes through the promise 
of tougheƌ iŵŵigƌatioŶ ĐoŶtƌols ;IǀaƌsflateŶ, ϮϬϬϱ; O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϭϬ; Foƌd, ϮϬϭϭ; Geddes, 
2014; Ford, Jennings & Sommerville, 2015). Immigration has become a toxic agenda, as 
public opinion across Western Europe continues to sway in favour of more restrictive 
immigration and asylum policies; a trend that appears to be increasing and paving the way 
for opportunistic right-wing parties across the continent (Ivarsflaten, 2005; Ford, 2011; Ford, 
Jennings & Sommerville, 2015). Here, evidence suggests that growing support for tougher 
immigration policies are not fuelled by perceived economic threat or competition, but 
rather by the threat that large inflows of regionally distinct migrants are believed to pose to 
the cultural hegemony of the indigenous population; as such certain migrants are preferable 
to others (Citrin, Green, Muste & Wong, 1997; Ivarsflaten, 2005; Brinkman, 2010; Ford, 
2011). Popular public opinion is thought to be, to some extent, a by-product of the 
influences of current policy restrictions and the rhetoric that often accompanies them (Ford, 
Jennings & Sommerville, 2015). In light of these concerns, current and prospective policy 
makers are faced with something of a dilemma: do they respond in kind to growing public 
demands for more restrictive policies, or do they continue to provide for the needs of the 
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globally integrated economy? As such, policy makers are, for the time being, searching 
desperately for their silver bullet; policies that can subdue growing public concern whilst 
simultaneously maintaining EU free movement obligations and catering for the demands of 
private interest groups (Ivarsflaten, 2005; Ford, Jennings & Sommerville, 2015). It is within 
the midst of this dilemma that the UK Independence Party (UKIP) has gradually emerged at 
the forefront of British politics. A single issue party that is vehemently opposed to British 
membership of the EU, UKIP have been able to market themselves to disillusioned working 
class Conservative and Labour voters alike (Ford & Goodwin, 2014; Geddes, 2014). As such, 
UKIP have been able to increase their appeal to the wider public by complementing their 
foundation of euroscepticism with appeals to rising public immigration concerns, and it is 
ǁithiŶ this ĐoŶteǆt that UKIP ďegaŶ to ďƌoadlǇ eŵulate the ŵedia͛s iŵŵigƌatioŶ Ŷaƌƌatiǀe 
regarding immigration from Romania and Bulgaria (Ford & Goodwin, 2014).  
 
Immigration has become something of a dirty word within contemporary British politics and 
is often discussed in a manner that broadly reflects the narrative of the tabloid media 
;O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϭϬ; LesiŶska, ϮϬϭϰ; BiaŶĐhi, PiŶotti aŶd BuoŶŶaŶo, ϮϬϭϮͿ. Heƌe, it is O͛NioŶ͛s 
(2010) view that, in the midst of the economic crisis, asylum seekers, refugees and even 
genuine migrants have been used as scapegoats by the political elite to deflect away from 
their own failings and incompetence. Some commentators have also pointed toward the 
role of the British and other European Political establishments as being primary sources and 
facilitators of this apparent growth of xenophobic discourse within contemporary western 
discourse ;Fekete, ϮϬϬϭ; “iǀaŶaŶdaŶ, ϮϬϬϭ; MĐGhee, ϮϬϬϱ; O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϭϬ; Foƌd, JeŶŶiŶgs & 
Sommerville, 2015).  
 
With ƌegaƌds to the poliĐǇ/ŵedia Ŷeǆus, it is MĐGhee͛s ;ϮϬϬϱͿ ĐoŶteŶtioŶ that Ŷaƌƌatiǀes 
concerning immigration and ethnic relations are simply a manifestation of former and 
current governments toughening of asylum policy whilst simultaneously liberalising 
immigration policy (McGhee, 2005; Ford, Jennings & Sommerville, 2014). When the Labour 
party came to office in 1997, public concerns around immigration were at their lowest in 
decades, thus in light of a steady liberalisation of immigration restrictions due to pressure 
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from private interest groups there was little public opposition (Ford, Jennings & 
Sommerville, 2014). Simultaneously, the Labour administration shifted towards more 
stringent restrictions on asylum policy in their attempts to deter prospectiǀe ͞asǇluŵ 
shoppeƌs͟ ;a ƌespoŶse to the peƌĐeptioŶ of BƌitaiŶ ďeiŶg ǀieǁed as a soft touĐh ǁelfaƌe 
state that invites external abuse); restrictions that some believe have contributed towards a 
state indorsed culture of outward suspicion and alienation towards asylum seekers and 
migrants alike, which is reciprocated by sections of the mainstream media and the public 
(Fekete, 2001; McGhee, 2005).  
 
“uĐh atteŵpts to appeaƌ tough oŶ pƌoďleŵatiĐ ͞asǇluŵ shoppeƌs͟ thƌough the 
implementation of restrictive policies and initiatives, such as replacing refugee financial 
support with vouchers and the systematic use of asylum detention centres have, to some 
extent served to validate and legitimise the widespread use of themes such as phoney and 
criminal asylum seekers, which have become endemic within contemporary discourse 
;Fekete, ϮϬϬϭ; O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϭϬͿ. IŶ this ƌegaƌd, GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt poliĐǇ toǁaƌds asǇluŵ seekeƌs 
could almost be construed as punitive in nature, whereby the common practice of 
withholding rights and the use of detention centres serve to criminalise prospective 
ƌefugees, asǇluŵ seekeƌs, aŶd, thƌough soŵe aƌďitƌaƌǇ ĐoŵŵoŶ assoĐiatioŶ of ͞otheƌŶess͟, 
legitiŵate ŵigƌaŶts ;O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϭϬ; HudsoŶ, ϮϬϬϴͿ. IŶ ŵaŶǇ Đases it is aĐtuallǇ the 
implementation of these stringent immigration controls themselves that create situations, 
whereby migrants and asylum seekers who do not meet the legal criteria to gain access are 
left with no choice but to turn to alternative, often illegal, avenues in order to reach their 
destination (Fekete, 2001). In this regard, it is the problematization of migrants through the 
use and implementation of inflammatory rhetoric and repressive policies that further 
perpetuates these groups vulnerability to criminality, both as victims and perpetrators 
(Fekete, 2001; Hudson, 2008). Unsurprisingly, such a cycle only serves to perpetuate the 
narratives that stem from Government and media sources, which further contribute toward 
the shaping of popular discourse around the of issue immigration and the consequences it 
has on the indigenous population, particularly the working and underclasses.    
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Fundamentally, this kind of discourse is discriminatory in nature. However, its central 
components are not anchored in the same thematic spectrum as classic discrimination, 
which is focused on racial and cultural differences, but rather on the competition for 
resources and economic burden which can accompany large scale immigration (Sivanandan, 
2001). Essentially, what is key here is that this modern discourse, referƌed to as ͞ǆeŶo-
ƌaĐisŵ͟, ƌepƌeseŶts a stƌuggle agaiŶst ŵodeƌŶisŵ ǁheƌeďǇ the iŶdigeŶous populatioŶ seek 
to preserve their way of life, their standard of living and cultural identity against the 
monumental tide of globalization (Sivanandan, 2001).  The primary criteria of this 
contemporary phenomena is therefore economic, and by implication, social standing rather 
than skin colour, nationality or cultural identity (Sirriyeh, 2015; Sivanandan, 2001; Fekete, 
2001; McGhee, 2005). According to Kaufmann (2014) this kind of discourse forms the 
ďedƌoĐk of UKIP͛s oppositioŶ to EU ŵeŵďeƌship aŶd the fƌee ŵoǀeŵeŶt of peoples that it 
entails. This is, in part, due to the strength and potency of liberal opposition to the very 
notion of anti-immigration and the kind of isolationist and nationalist rhetoric that typifies it 
(Ivarsflaten, 2005; Kaufmann, 2014).  
 
As such, any attempts for rational discussions regarding immigration have been stifled and 
derailed by the moral sensibilities of the liberal elite, for whom the very notion of public 
anxiety about immigration is regarded as atavistic nationalism reminiscent of German 
Nazism. However, despite the best efforts of the liberal elite to nullify the issue, opposition 
to large scale immigration retains a considerable amount of public support, not just in the 
UK, but across Europe (Ivarsflaten, 2005; Brinkman, 2010). Yet it is this self-appointed 
position of moral monopoly held by the left and its attempts to dictate its self-superior 
worldview on the masses, in spite of public opposition, that has been the catalyst for the 
emergence of opportunistic nationalist parties like UKIP across much of Western Europe 
(Ivarsflaten, 2005; McLaren, 2011; Kaufmann, 2014). Thus, the rising support for UKIP, a 
single agenda, anti-immigration party, is the result of the political elites disregard for public 
concerns around the issue of immigration and the manner in which this has translated into 
distrust of the mainstream parties (Ivarsflaten, 2005; McLaren, 2011; Kaufmann, 2014). The 
importance of tough immigration policy as a potential vote winner appears to have had a 
profound effect on popular political discourse, whereby parties attempt to outdo one and 
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other by proposing tougher measures in order to appease public concerns (Lesinka, 2014; 
O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϭϬ; Geddes, ϮϬϭϰ; Foƌd, JeŶŶiŶgs & “oŵŵeƌǀile, ϮϬϭϰͿ. Heƌe, the liŵited 
thematic spectrum of political discourse communicates to the public the generalized image 
of the parasitic, criminally inclined migrant, which is broadly applied to prospective migrants 
before they have even entered the country.  
 
There is also limited evidence that indicates a link between populist anti-immigration 
narratives and the perpetration of hate crimes and discrimination against migrants and 
minority groups (Gad et al, 2005). Gadd et al (2005) found that when they asked their 
sample of convicted hate offenders to rationalize their actions, many of them expressed 
͞ŵitigatiŶg͟ ƌeasoŶs that ƌefleĐted the gƌieǀaŶĐes ĐoŶtaiŶed iŶ aŶti-immigration rhetoric. 
Similarly, the ďaĐkgƌouŶd of those ǁho ŵade up Gadd et al͛s ;ϮϬϬϱͿ saŵple was typical of 
those disillusioŶed ͚left ďehiŶd͛ deŵogƌaphiĐs ŵost likelǇ to sǇŵpathise ǁith ƌight ǁiŶg 
nationalist parties such as UKIP: uneducated, unemployed, poor and feeling threatened 
economically by the presence of foreign competition (Ford and Goodwin, 2014; Geddes, 
2014). Thus, although not exclusively at fault, like the media, the rhetoric emanating from 
opportunistic anti-immigration parties may certainly contribute towards an environment of 
suspicion and hostility toward migrants by portraying these groups as a serious threat to the 
already disadvantaged classes of society (Statham and Geddes, 2006; McLaren & Johnson, 
2007).    
 
To summarize, throughout Western Europe there has been growing public concern 
regarding high levels of immigration which is perceived to be the product of laissez faire 
immigration policies. Despite these growing concerns, successive national governments 
have failed to appease public concerns due to the external policy constraints of EU free 
movement directives. The inability of successive governments to act on these concerns has 
facilitated a climate of distrust in the main political parties, in turn paving the way for 
former fringe parties, such as UKIP, to come to the forefront of the political landscape. In 
doing so, UKIP have been able to galvanise their anti-EU agenda by underlining the inability 
of sovereign states to control their own borders whilst they remain members of the EU. 
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Simultaneously, UKIP have been able to utilize growing underlying distrust of mainstream 
parties, in particular Labour, who are seen by many in the working class to have abandoned 
them in favour of multiculturalist policies. As such, the costs of immigration from other EU 
meŵďeƌ states has ďeĐoŵe a foĐal poiŶt of UKIP͛s ageŶda ǁhiĐh ĐoŶtiŶues to appeal to the 
insecurities of the working and underclasses through the propagation of crude stereotypes 
and class division; similar to the tactics employed by certain sections of the tabloid media 
press.  
 
2.8 Conclusion  
To summarise, the literature considered in this review indicates that the experience of FoC 
is generally more pronounced among migrant and minority communities. A number of fear 
aggravating factors are considered, including the anxiety of moving country, language and 
cultural barriers, loss of family support networks and diminished employment prospects. 
Victimization risks are also considered, such as lower education, lower average age, lack of 
private transport and likelihood of living in high disorder areas. The literature also indicates 
that although race is a significant determinant of hate crime experience and fear, various 
sources in the UK indicate that such crimes are becoming a more common experience for 
Caucasian Eastern-European migrants and that this might be linked to and motivated by the 
stigma that has become attached to these groups through sensationalist media coverage 
that seeks to problematize these groups. Limited literature here suggests a link between the 
motivation of hate crime offenders and the circulation of sensationalist anti-immigration 
rhetoric. Furthermore, literature concerning the role of the media suggests that it does have 
the power to shape and influence the worldview of its audiences through the way it frames 
particular issues and events. Here, the literature indicates that the manner in which various 
tabloid sources frame Eastern-European migrants, in particular Poles, Romanians and 
Bulgarians, fits the template of a moral panic, within which prospective migrants are heavily 
labelled and demonized to the public, which in turn serves to promote fear, bigotry and 
hostility towards newcomers. Limited research also indicates that the propagation of such 
narratives may factor into some minoƌitǇ gƌoups͛ FoC aŶd peƌĐeptioŶs of ǀulŶeƌaďilitǇ, as 
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well as motivation for the actions of some hate crime offenders. Literature also indicates 
that Government policies toward and scapegoating of migrants may also influence growing 
public immigration concerns and resentment towards migrants. Literature also indicates 
that the ambivalence of successive governments towards public immigration concerns have 
been key in the emergence of UKIP, a Eurosceptic party that is strongly opposed to EU 
immigration, which appears to be gaining growing support from the voting public. Much like 
the taďloid ŵedia, UKIP͛s puďliĐitǇ ĐaŵpaigŶs aƌe heaǀilǇ foĐused oŶ the pƌoďleŵatizatioŶ 
of and vehement opposition to migration to the UK from A8 and A2 EU states.   
 
Broadly speaking, the literature indicates that, for a variety of reasons, migrant and minority 
groups are likely to experience more pronounced FoC than the general population as whole. 
However, there is limited evidence to indicate just what impact sensationalist and 
problematizing media and political rhetoric have upon the groups they specifically target. 
Whilst a limited body of research (Refugee Actions, 2002; ICAR, 2004) does suggest that 
critical and sensationalist portrayals of refugees and asylum seekers can exacerbate 
ŵeŵďeƌs of these gƌoups͛ peƌĐeptioŶs of FoC aŶd peƌĐeiǀed ǀulŶeƌaďilitǇ, it is still uŶĐleaƌ 
exactly why this is the case, or whether and how such fearful responses are influenced by 
other FoC aggravating and mitigating factors. It is also unclear whether this phenomena is 
confined to particularly vulnerable groups or members of such groups as both studies 
concerned refugees and asylum seekers, both of which could be regarded as highly 
vulnerable groups. Furthermore, it is also unclear whether such fearful reactions are also 
experienced by other popularly demonized and problematized migrant groups. Similarly 
there is little evidence to indicate whether disparaging media and political rhetoric produce 
similar fearful responses from members of targeted non-vulnerable groups, if any. 
Furthermore, it is unclear what role ethnicity plays in the emergence of FoC or perceptions 
of vulnerability among physically non-distinct migrant or minority groups. It is also unclear 
whether migrants whose FoC is linked to rhetoric perceive a specific threat from specific 
groups within British society (white working/underclasses). 
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Research objective and questions 
The primary research objective of this study is: 
 Objective: To assess and explore the potential impact that mounting media and 
political anti-iŵŵigƌatioŶ ƌhetoƌiĐ has oŶ ŵeŵďeƌs of taƌgeted ŵigƌaŶt gƌoups͛ 
experience of FoC.  
  RQ1: Do first or second-hand experiences of discrimination or victimization effect 
iŶdiǀidual͛s peƌĐeptioŶs of the aggƌaǀatiŶg iŶflueŶĐe of anti-immigration rhetoric?  ‘QϮ: What faĐtoƌs iŶflueŶĐe ŵeŵďeƌs of pƌoďleŵatized ŵigƌaŶt gƌoups͛ feaƌs aŶd 
concerns of being victims of discrimination or hate crime?   RQ3: Do migrants feel marginalized or more likely to experience discrimination or 
violence because of prevalent anti-immigration rhetoric?  RQ4: Do members of groups targeted by rhetoric perceived a specific threat of 
racially motivated crime from indigenous working/underclasses? 
If, as Cohen (2002) argues, these hostile and problematized reactions to contemporary 
immigration concerns are but one in a continuum of many reactions to new waves of 
immigration, then the necessity of developing a better understanding of the impact of such 
reactions on their targets is quite clear. Within the context of an eastward expanding 
European Union which might, if current trends continue, one day include countries such as 
Ukraine, the former Yugoslav republics and even Turkey, it is likely that the hostile 
reactionary narratives investigated within this study will re-emerge in tandem with new 
ideal taƌget ͞otheƌs͟. It is Đleaƌ that this pheŶoŵeŶoŶ is Ŷot a Ŷeǁ oŶe aŶd ǁill likelǇ ƌeĐuƌ 
again in the future. So long as economic growth remains at the top of the political agenda 
and immigration is seen as a quick means of achieving this end, immigration and the 
outpour of concern that so often accompanies it will continue to make the headlines and 
continue to be seized upon by opportunistic reactionary parties that seeks to exploit public 
fears for political gain. As such, the development of a more robust understanding of the 
impact that this directed hostile rhetoric, which so often accompanies these concerns, has 
upon members of targeted groups is a matter of current and future concern for both 
members of targeted groups and the future of multicultural Britain.  
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3. Research methodology  
The primary purpose of this study was to develop an understanding of if and how negative 
politiĐal aŶd ŵedia poƌtƌaǇals of ƌeĐeŶt EU iŵŵigƌaŶts affeĐt these iŶdiǀiduals͛ FoC ǁhilst 
living within the UK.  
This chapter will explain the methodology of the study. The first section will consider and 
justify the methodological and epistemological approaches utilized in this study. The second 
section will describe the design of this study including data collection, sampling and analysis. 
The final section will provide a discussion of the limitations of this study from a 
methodological perspective.  
 
 
3.1 Epistemology 
In keeping with its primary aims, this study subscribes to an interpretivist epistemological 
position and argues that the social world and the interactions between social actors that 
reside within it are subjective in nature and that in order to best develop an understanding 
of this world, phenomena and social actors, research must seek to view this world through 
the eyes, and by implication the subjective interpretations, of those subjects that reside 
within it (Bryman, 2012; Henn, Matthews & Ross, 2010; Weinstein & Foard, 2006). As 
Farrall, Bannister, Ditton & Gilchrist (1997) note, previous FoC studies have drawn 
considerable criticism for their adherence to a positivist epistemological position, which 
some argue means that such studies fail to fully appreciate and reflect the full value of 
ƌeseaƌĐh paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐes aŶd feeliŶgs ;BƌǇŵaŶ, ϭϵϴϰ; BoǁliŶg, ϭϵϵϯͿ. Fuƌtheƌ, 
Farrall et al (1997) assert that quantitative methods which adhere to a positivist 
epistemological position are inadequate for studying FoC because they measure 
paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ feeliŶgs oŶ a ǀeƌǇ ďƌoad aŶd geŶeƌal sĐale ǁhiĐh leads to iŶĐoŶsisteŶt aŶd 
over-estimations of participants͛ eŵotioŶal ƌespoŶses to Đƌiŵe. As suĐh, this studǇ ƌejeĐts 
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the epistemological position of positivism (that is, that social phenomena are objective in 
nature and that these phenomena can be studied and explained in the same way as the 
natural sciences), and employs a qualitative methodological approach that accommodates 
an interpretivist epistemological position.   
3.2 Methodology 
A qualitative methodology was used in the current study because it enabled the study to 
use an interpretivist epistemological position which has been identified as the most 
appropriate for investigating FoC. This study is primarily concerned with the development, 
rather than testing, of a theoretical understanding of the relationship between hostile 
media and political rhetoric of recent EU immigrants, perceptions of FoC among migrant 
student participants already living within the UK and the relationship between these issues.   
 
The utilization of a qualitative methodological approach affords the researcher the ability to 
be able to immerse themselves within these subjective and often highly complex 
interpretations of phenomena from the perspective of the research participant. Such 
subjective and in depth perspectives are afforded to the researcher through the utilization 
of a qualitative approach because it puts particular emphasis on the importance of the 
individual and the respective interpretations and meanings that they give to particular social 
phenomena within the world around them. Within the qualitative tradition, data pertaining 
to such perspectives are typically acquired through the utilization of in-depth interviews 
that consist of open-ended questions. These kinds of interviews allow both participants and 
researchers a great deal of manoeuvrability in their answers, follow up questions and the 
subsequent theoretical understandings of the relationship between actors and phenomena 
that the resultant data generates. Such approaches are specifically designed and utilized in 
order to extract relevant and rich data that pertains to the subjective understandings of 
respective participants. Due to sheer volume of data that methods stemming from a 
qualitative tradition are inclined to generate, the data samples employed in such studies 
tend to be much smaller than those typically employed in quantitative studies, permitting a 
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far more intimate understanding of specific phenomena from the perspective of the 
individual. A qualitative methodology therefore allows the researcher to study particular 
pheŶoŵeŶa iŶ detail ͞fƌoŵ the iŶside͟ perspective of the social actors they affect (Punch, 
2005; David & Sutton, 2010; Bryman, 2012).  
3.3 Data collection method 
IŶ keepiŶg ǁith the Ƌualitatiǀe Ŷatuƌe of the studǇ͛s ƌeseaƌĐh desigŶ, audio-recorded semi-
structured interviews were the method of data collection. All interviews were conducted on 
a face-to-face basis with participants and lasted between 45 – 60 minutes. This data 
collection instrument was selected because of it flexible design which provides the 
researcher with a malleable platform from which they can reasonably adapt their line of 
enquiry to best suit and explore the subjective interpretations and experiences of the 
research participant (Bryman, 2012; Robson, 2011). Although such an approach is quite time 
consuming in terms of interview and transcription efforts, it allows the interviewee a great 
deal of freedom when it comes to answering questions which, although pre-planned, are 
open in nature and thus allow for the communication of their subjective interpretations and 
feelings, which would not be possible had qualitative surveys been instead employed (Braun 
& Clarke, 2012).  
 
With regards to FoC, reviews of past studies have revealed that research results vary quite 
considerably depending upon whether open or closed questions were employed (Farrall et 
al, 1997). Here, findings indicate that studies which used closed-ended questions produced 
inflated results indicating the prevalence and severity of FoC when compared to studies 
which utilized open ended questions. This, according to Farrall et al (1997) indicates that 
closed question surveys ignore the subjective meanings of events for respondents and 
neglect that FoC is a multifaceted phenomenon which requires a less restricted approach to 
fully appreciate.  
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Further, semi-structured interviews, unlike unstructured interviews, allow the interviewer to 
direct their line of enquiry toward specific, pre-prepared topics of interests whilst also 
allowing the interviewer to identify and alter their line of enquiry towards key topics that 
might unexpectedly emerge during the interview process (Bryman, 2012; Robson, 2011; 
Braun & Clarke, 2013).  
 
Interviews were guided by an interview schedule which consisted of five core topics for 
discussion which emerged from a review of existing literature in this field: impressions of 
the media and political rhetoric, views on increased popularity of right wing political parties, 
impressions and experiences of discrimination and FoC. Each of these topic sections 
featured a number of pre-prepared questions, however the specific ordering and wording of 
these ƋuestioŶs ǁeƌe opeŶ to alteƌatioŶ depeŶdeŶt oŶ the ƌespoŶdeŶt͛s ƌespoŶses. In 
keeping with the nature of semi-structured interviews, responses were probed for further 
clarifications and meaningful interpretations.  
3.4 Sample 
At the start of research, the study intended to use a purposive sample in order to include a 
broad demographic of respondents from Eastern Europe (Bryman, 2012, Robson, 2011; 
David & Sutton, 2011; Matthews & Ross, 2010). Such being the case, other sampling 
methods, such as theoretical sampling, were  considered less appropriate instruments for  
getting the required sample for reasons such as time constraints, limited flexibility and 
methodological complexity (Bryman, 2012; Matthews & Ross, 2010).   
 
With the research purpose in mind, the study sought to utilize the internationally diverse 
student profile of the University. This setting was chosen for a number of reasons; firstly, 
the University campus represents a central hub of activity for migrant students, making 
participants more readily accessible; secondly, given that the University requires 
international students to attain a certain level of English proficiency prior to their 
application acceptance, international student participants from within the University were 
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expected to be able to better express and articulate their views during interviews than non-
student migrants who might have lower levels of English proficiency.  
 
In order to enhance the validity and consistency of the study, the study limited the sample 
to students from those countries which are most widely problematized within 
contemporary media and political discussion. Thus, Romanian, Bulgarian and Polish students 
were identified as best fitting the specific criteria of the research sample. For accessibility 
and consistency purposes the study sample was confined to current students at the 
University who, it was originally presumed, would be easily accessible through contacting 
international student societies.  
 
However, this was not the case as despite numerous attempts, the researcher was only able 
to make contact with the Presidents of the Bulgarian and Romanian societies. Of the two it 
was only the Romanian society, via their President, that co-operated with the researcher 
and advertised the study to its members. Whilst this provided the researcher with access to 
a desirable sample, this did not yield the participant numbers required for the intended 
sample size of 12 – 15. In light of these issues, the sampling approach and criteria were 
slightly revised towards a snowball sample that would also include recent graduates 
(Robson, 2011; Bryman, 2012; David & Sutton, 2011). In hindsight, for the purpose of this 
studǇ aŶd the eǆĐlusiǀitǇ of the saŵple ƌeƋuiƌed aŶd the seeŵiŶglǇ ͞haƌd-to-ƌeaĐh͟ Ŷatuƌe 
of target sample population, a snowball sample may have actually been a more suitable 
sampling technique from the start (Noy, 2008; Matthews & Ross, 2010; Bryman, 2012). 
Although not as successful as initially expected, the purposive sample originally employed in 
this study did provide access, albeit limited, to a desired demographic from which to then 
snowball from. As such, the final sample for this study was acquired through the utilization 
of purposive and snowball sampling methods. It is also worth noting that there was also an 
element of opportunistic sampling. This being the case, the final sample primarily consisted 
of Romanian students and as such it could be argued that the findings of this study better 
reflect the experiences of this particular demographic than of Eastern European migrants as 
a wider group. The final sample consisted of 10 Romanians, 1 Pole and 1 Bulgarian, the 
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latter two of which were referred to the researcher by participants that emerged from the 
original purposive sample.  
 
3.5 Data analysis 
The data set consisted of around 12 hours of audio-recordings which were transcribed by 
the researcher. In order to maintain the anonymity and confidentiality of research 
participants, pseudonyms were used for participants in the transcriptions and within the 
thesis. Transcribed data was then analysed through thematic analysis, from which emergent 
recurring themes were used to form and guide the theoretical discussion and the 
conclusions which emerged from the data. Thematic analysis is a method of data analysis 
which is widely employed throughout the social sciences, however, despite its wide scale 
implementation, thematic analysis is largely undervalued and under-credited as an 
instrument for data analysis (Bryman, 2012, Braun & Clarke, 2006). Unlike some other data 
analysis systems, thematic analysis has been praised by some for its flexible design, making 
it a versatile data analysis instrument which can be successfully applied to a wide array of 
qualitative studies (Braun & Clarke, 2006). A thematic approach to data analysis requires the 
researcher to remain immersed in their data throughout the analytical process, however, 
such an approach allows the researcher to work closely with and process this data, visual 
and/or verbal, whilst maintaining and retaining the original contextual substance of data in 
its rawest form (Matthews & Ross, 2010). Further, although somewhat less refined than 
critical discourse analysis and less structured than content analysis, thematic analysis ability 
to identify and analyse themes that emerge from raw data make it a more practical 
approach for analysing larger volumes of qualitative data, albeit providing a relatively less 
detailed examination.  
 
Although flexible in design, thorough thematic analysis still requires the researcher to 
conduct his/her analysis within certain structural confines (Matthews & Ross, 2010, Bryman, 
2012).  In this regard, the researcher must first immerse him/herself in the raw data set, 
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comparing and contrasting it between individual cases/interviews in order to identify 
emerging patterns (themes) of interest that relate to the research topic (Bryman, 2012; 
Matthews & Ross, 2010; Braun & Clarke, 2006). As such, a theme captures an aspect of 
understanding of social phenomena which is relevant to the research topic and as such can 
be used to further understanding of that particular phenomena through the inference of 
theoretical relevance from within the contextual framework within which the data and 
themes emerged (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Here, the repetition of topics, use of metaphors 
and/or analogies, the natural metamorphosis of topical discussion and reference to 
theoretically related material can signal or constitute the emergence of a thematic 
framework (Bryman, 2012). However, the prevalence of said themes across the data set is, 
in some regards, the essence of what constitutes the strength of an emerging themes 
relevance and theoretical weight (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In terms of practical application, 
thematic analysis is, according to Braun and Clarke (2006; 2013) a much less complex and 
intimidating approach to qualitative data analysis than some of the more established 
approaches, such as discourse analysis or interpretive phenomenology analysis. 
3.6 Ethics 
This ƌeseaƌĐh has adheƌed to the staŶdaƌds of the Bƌitish “oĐietǇ of CƌiŵiŶologǇ͛s Đode of 
ethical practice (BSC, 2006). In addition, this study was subject to ethical scrutiny from the 
School of Human and Health Sciences ethics board prior to receiving ethical approval to 
proceed. Central to this study are the ethical principles of confidentiality, anonymity, 
informed consent and potential harms to participants stemming from involvement in the 
study.  
 
Prior to their agreed participation, all prospective participants were informed of; the study 
purpose, the dissemination of resultant findings, their rights to anonymity and 
confidentiality, their right to withdraw their data from the study prior to the write-up period 
and provided with provisions detailing access to local psychological support that were in 
place, should they need to access them.    
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All research participants were made aware of the ethical principles which governed this 
study prioƌ to theiƌ iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt. PaƌtiĐipaŶts͛ ideŶtities ǁeƌe aŶoŶǇŵised ǁithiŶ the 
transcription and write-up phases of the study through the use of pseudonym aliases. 
Further, all identifying documents; signed consent forms and audio recorded data, were 
stored iŶ safe aŶd seĐuƌe loĐatioŶs; the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ͛s hoŵe aŶd passǁoƌd loĐked peƌsoŶal 
computer. As such, data and documents were only accessible to the researcher and, should 
they wish to access them, the research project supervisors.  
 
Because of the exclusive demographic and topical nature of this study; hostile media, 
political and by implication, public references to Eastern European migrants and how these 
affeĐt said ŵigƌaŶts͛ peƌĐeptioŶs of peƌsoŶal safetǇ aŶd ǁell-being, it was foreseen that 
participants could potentially experience some forms of psychological distress prior to 
participation in the study. Such being the case, precautions were taken to ensure that 
participants were made aware of and given access to relevant psychological support 
networks. As such, the researcher made preliminary contact with the University of 
Huddeƌsfield͛s WellďeiŶg aŶd DisaďilitǇ seƌǀiĐes, ǁho, oŶĐe pƌopeƌlǇ iŶfoƌŵed of the 
researchers concerns, provided a complement of information leaflets for their psychological 
support services. These leaflets were provided to all research participants prior to their 
participation in the interview process.  
3.7 Limitations of method 
No research project is without methodological limitations. This study employed a qualitative 
methodology as opposed to quantitative or mixed methods approach. A qualitative 
approach was deemed to be the most suited toward meeting the primary purpose of this 
study; to develop an understanding of if and how negative political and media portrayals of 
ƌeĐeŶt EU iŵŵigƌaŶts affeĐt these iŶdiǀiduals͛ peƌĐeptioŶs of FoC, ǁhilst ƌesidiŶg ǁithiŶ the 
UK. Of course, by employing such an approach the researcher has subsequently introduced 
this study to a number of methodological limitations and criticisms. The most obvious of 
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these limitations is the generalizability of any findings deduced from this study. Owing to 
the typically small sampling sizes of qualitative research, the findings of this study cannot be 
applied and generalized as being representative of the experiences and views of the entire 
population of Eastern European migrants living in the UK.  Of course, the findings of this 
study were never intended to be generalized and applied to the wider population, neither 
does it or the discipline of qualitative research claim to do so (Creswell, 2014). Rather, it was 
hoped this studǇ͛s fiŶdiŶgs ǁould pƌoǀide a fouŶdatioŶ of theoƌetiĐal iŶsight, ǁheƌe theƌe 
has been little before, into the subjective experiences and impressions of Eastern European 
migrants living in the UK.  
 
This leads on to another criticism often levelled at qualitative research; that qualitative 
research, by its very nature, is simply too subjective (Bryman, 2011; Henn, Weinstein & 
Foard, 2006). This criticism primarily stems from the position of the researcher in qualitative 
ƌeseaƌĐh aŶd the ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh the ƌeseaƌĐheƌs͛ deĐisioŶs goǀeƌŶ the keǇ faĐtoƌs that 
influence the research such as the setting, selection of research participants and 
interpretations given to the data (Henn, Weinstein & Foard, 2006). In the case of this study, 
the researcher has tried to reasonably justify their rationale for making these decisions.  
 
Another key criticism of qualitative research, which is certainly applicable to this study, is 
the reactivity of the research participants and how this can compromise the internal validity 
of the research findings. Reactivity refers to the way in which people conduct themselves 
when they know they are being researched and whether or not the behaviour, actions and 
accounts produced by research under these circumstances is a true reflection of the subject 
being researched (Henn, Weinstein & Foard, 2006). 
 
A further limitation of this study, realized in hindsight, stems from the selection of the 
sample population; students from Eastern Europe. The experiences and views of this group 
of migrants, given their position of relative privilege as receivers of higher education, the 
role and liberal atmosphere of the University institution and the highly visible presence of 
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an ethically and nationally diverse student demographic at the university are factors that 
could potentially distort the external validity of the research outcomes. Furthermore, the 
final sample of this study could also be construed as being only narrowly representative of 
the views and experiences of a small fragment of the Eastern European student population 
in the UK, given the apparent lack of interest from the wider target sample demographic. 
 
4. Findings and analysis 
The primary aim of this study is to investigate whether and how anti-immigration rhetoric 
affects levels of fear of crime for members of targeted migrant groups. The recent surge in 
anti-immigration rhetoric has been primarily focused on and stimulated by the ascension of 
former Soviet bloc nations into the EU and the potential problems entail for the UK. 
Supporters of this rhetoric have sought to emphasize the issues that large scale immigration 
from these countries, as part of the EU free movement initiative, will have on the UK (e.g. 
oŶ eŵploǇŵeŶt, health Đaƌe, housiŶg, otheƌ ƌesouƌĐes, aŶd Bƌitish ͞Đultuƌe͟Ϳ. As paƌt of this 
rhetoric, supporters make sweeping stereotypes and generalizations that frame the 
discussion in the context of crime, burden and threat to the indigenous population of the 
UK.  The current study conducted a number of interviews with University students from 
those nations which have been construed as the most problematic in this discourse; Poland, 
Bulgaria and Romania, in order to ascertain the impact that such narratives have on 
perceptions of FoC.  
 
Evidence from existing literature on FoC among migrant groups has consistently suggested 
that, for a variety of reasons, migrants have higher FoC in their newly adopted countries 
than non-migrants. As such, this study hypothesised that the prevalence of anti-immigration 
rhetoric would bring about a heightened sense of FoC among participants belonging to 
those targeted groups. In all, however, the findings from the data challenged this 
hypothesis.  
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During the interviews, participants were asked about their impressions of popular anti-
immigration rhetoric, which broadly problematizes their nationality, and its impact on their 
own safety and wellbeing whilst living in the UK. The findings are presented in two groups: 
1) for participants who were fearful of crime, the reasons why and the impact, if any, of 
media and political narrative, and 2) participants who were not fearful, the reasons why and 
impact of media and political narrative.  
 
The findings of this study suggest that the primary factor in FoC among participants was not 
targeted political or media rhetoric, as hypothesised, but rather direct lived experiences of 
aggression and harassment that were somehow related to their nationality. The findings 
also indicate, however, that those participants who had experienced harassment were also 
far more concerned about media and political rhetoric than those who had not had such 
experiences. These findings challenged the original hypothesis (that the majority of 
participants would be fearful of crime because of anti-immigration rhetoric), but found that 
participants who had been previous victimised were more mindful of its existence.  
4.1 The ͞feaƌful͟ gƌoup 
Although the findings and results of the current study were largely contradictory to those in 
previous literature, it should be noted that this was not entirely the case throughout and 
that soŵe paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ aĐĐouŶts did ƌefleĐt those pƌeseŶted iŶ pƌeǀious studies. These 
accounts were shaped by having personally experienced incidents of harassment and 
discrimination, the main substance of which had led them to believe that these incidents 
were linked to media and political rhetoric. These experiences were the key factors in FoC 
among these participants, rather than media or political rhetoric. However, that data would 
also suggest that those participants who had experienced harassment were far more 
concerned about the potential implications that political and media rhetoric might have for 
their safety than those participants who had not experienced such incidents.  
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4.2 Experience of harassment and discrimination  
For some participants the prospect of being harassed or of experiencing discrimination 
related to their nationality had been a very real one and not just a hypothetical prospect as 
it had been for the majority of other participants. These incidents varied in severity, from 
covert to overt discrimination, as did the fearful responses of these participants. 
Unsurprisingly, the most pronounced instances of harassment and discrimination had 
clearly taken an emotional toll on their victims, who were clearly fearful of experiencing 
similar incidents again.  
IVϲ: ͞I had a situatioŶ oŶ the stƌeet ǁheƌe soŵeďodǇ asked ŵe foƌ ŵoŶeǇ: ͞heǇ loǀe, 
Ǉou got aŶǇ spaƌe ĐhaŶge͟, he heaƌd ŵǇ aĐĐeŶt aŶd ďeĐaŵe aggƌessiǀe: ͞Oh Ǉou 
fucking Polish, coming over here, stealing our jobs, stealing our benefits. Look at me, 
I͛ŵ oŶ the stƌeets ďeggiŶg foƌ ŵoŶeǇ, Ǉou should shaƌe it ǁith ŵe!͟ People look at 
Ǉou at the ďus stop ďut Ǉou doŶ͛t ǁaŶt to saǇ aŶǇthiŶg ďeĐause Ǉou doŶ͛t ǁaŶt aŶǇ 
pƌoďleŵs, ďut ŶoďodǇ else is saǇiŶg aŶǇthiŶg aŶd Ǉou͛ƌe left thiŶkiŶg ͞ǁhat aƌe theǇ 
thiŶkiŶg, ǁill theǇ suppoƌt ŵe, ǁill theǇ take his side?͟, ďeĐause I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ, it͛s his 
country and his opinion. Now I just avoid public conversations all together and I think 
͞Ǉes, it has ĐhaŶged a lot͟ You doŶ͛t feel as ĐoŶfideŶt as Ǉou did ďefoƌe oƌ iŶ Ǉouƌ 
own country where you can just start a conversation with anyone. Everywhere I go 
Ŷoǁ I͛ŵ just sĐaƌed of ĐoŶǀeƌsatioŶ ďeĐause soŵeďodǇ ŵight staƌt ďlaŵiŶg Ǉou foƌ 
ĐoŵiŶg aŶd liǀiŶg iŶ this ĐouŶtƌǇ.͟  
IV12: People notice I am not English all the time, they always ask where I am from 
ǁheŶ theǇ heaƌ ŵǇ aĐĐeŶt. It͛s become a bit of an issue for me now because I am 
torn about whether to disclose my nationality or not for fear of going through that 
kind of thing again [harassment & covert discrimination]. I just avoid looking and 
peoples͛ faĐes Ŷoǁ aŶd saǇiŶg ǁheƌe I am from. It makes me feel awful.  For me to 
be scared or embarrassed about being Romanian is to be embarrassed of my whole 
ďeiŶg. It͛s aǁful.͟ 
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These participants had experienced varying degrees of discrimination and harassment, 
which they believed had been prompted by the discovery or assumption of their nationality 
by strangers in public settings, such as public transport or city centres. The data suggests 
that, regardless of severity, such experiences prompted these participants to genuinely 
consider the link between the hostility they had experienced and the similar nature of 
hostile media and, to a lesser extent, political rhetoric: 
IVϲ: ͞It is Ŷoǁ [ŵedia ƌhetoƌiĐ ĐƌeatiŶg stigŵatized iŵage], ŵaŶǇ people do ďelieǀe 
that we are coming here to steal their jobs, steal their benefits, and just steal money 
fƌoŵ this ĐouŶtƌǇ. I thiŶk that is thaŶks to the ŵedia that ǁe aƌe seeŶ this ǁaǇ͟  
IVϭϮ: ͞TheǇ ǁouldŶ͛t haǀe these ďad opiŶioŶs aďout us if theǇ didŶ͛t kŶoǁ soŵethiŶg 
aďout us. I ŵeaŶ, if I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ aŶǇthing about a place and I meet someone from 
there I will just treat them as they come. Do you know what I mean? But if you 
already have this seed in your mind from these sources that Romanians or Bulgarians 
are really bad and that we come here only to steal and claim benefits then you will 
tƌeat theŵ like gaƌďage.͟ 
Although some participants considered these experiences to be fairly innocuous and 
therefore undeserving of serious concern, others reacted in a much more distinctly fearful 
manner.  Those participants who were most fearful explicitly sought conceal their foreign 
identity. Here, it was the case that some fearful participants actively sought to avoid 
ƌeǀealiŶg theiƌ ŶatioŶalitǇ to stƌaŶgeƌs iŶ puďliĐ plaĐes iŶ oƌdeƌ to aǀoid the ͞otheƌiŶg͟ aŶd 
harassment that their previous experiences had led them to believe would be likely to 
follow. These participants actively sought to avoid making eye contact or conversation with 
strangers in public places for fear of revealing their only real distinctly foreign feature, their 
accents. That these participants actively sought to conceal their foreignness, in order to 
aǀoid poteŶtial haƌassŵeŶt oƌ ͞otheƌiŶg͟ ďǇ puƌposefullǇ iŵpleŵeŶtiŶg aǀoidaŶĐe 
teĐhŶiƋues, iŶdiĐates a Đleaƌ eǆaŵple of these paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ daǇ to day experiences of FoC, 
which they perceived to be directly linked to their nationality.   
 
For some fearful participants who had experienced instances of discrimination or 
harassment, the risk of revealing their foreignness appeared to vary depending on the 
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setting they were in. The rationale for these fluctuations appeared to have been significantly 
informed by the kind of environment in which their previous encounters of discrimination 
and harassment had occurred. Here, it was the case that some fearful participants had 
perception of the kind of settings and places where they were most vulnerable to similar 
incidents. This environmental awareness also appeared to influence the extent to which 
these participants felt required to use avoidance techniques, thus indicating an evaluation 
of external vulnerability in particular settings. These participants also appeared to make pre-
eŵptiǀe assessŵeŶts of the ͞tǇpe͟ of people theǇ ǁould eŶĐouŶteƌ iŶ ĐeƌtaiŶ puďliĐ settiŶgs 
which also appeared to influence their fearfulness and the extent to which they used 
avoidance techniques. This particular assessment, as will be discussed later, was linked to 
paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ peƌĐeptioŶs of the ͞tǇpes͟ of people ǁith ǁhoŵ ƌhetoƌiĐ ǁould ƌesoŶate. 
Thus, the data indicates that this pre-eŵptiǀe aŶalǇsis ǁas ďased upoŶ paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ pƌe-
determined expectations of how individuals from certain socio-economic groups would 
likely respond to discovering their foreign identity:   
IVϲ: ͞It͛s ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ oŶ Ǉouƌ ŵiŶd. I liǀe Đlose to a ďig ĐouŶcil estate, so I avoid talking 
at all Đosts. These people, theǇ ǁill saǇ ͞hi hoǁ aƌe Ǉou͟ aŶd ďe all sŵileǇ uŶtil theǇ 
heaƌ Ǉouƌ aĐĐeŶt aŶd ƌealize Ǉou͛ƌe Polish aŶd theŶ it͛s suddeŶlǇ all ͞Oh Ǉou f**kiŶg 
Polish Đoŵe heƌe, so ŵaŶǇ of Ǉou͟ aŶd so oŶ...͟  
Furthermore, these participants were also more reluctant to reveal their foreign identity in 
public buildings, spaces or transport than they were whilst on the University campus itself. 
This assessment was influenced by a combination of factors; 1) these participants had not 
experienced harassment or discrimination in the University setting, 2) the broad 
demographic of the University itself is one that could be characterized as both international 
and ethnically diverse, within which participants foreignness is not distinctly obvious, and 3) 
theǇ ďelieǀed that the ͞tǇpe͟ of people that theǇ ǁould eŶĐouŶteƌ oŶ Đaŵpus ǁeƌe 
considerably less likely to react to their foreign identity in a hostile manner than might be 
the case for members of the wider public. As such, fearful participants felt that the 
revelation of their nationality in the University campus was considerably less risky. This 
assessment of perceived vulnerability appeared to be linked the anticipated responses that 
rhetoric would elicit from members of its target audiences. Here, fearful participants felt 
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that they were most vulnerable in share public spaces because they were more likely to be 
discovered by rhetoric subscribers who might harass or assault them: 
 
IVϯ: ͞“o Ǉes, it [disĐƌiŵiŶatioŶ] ǁas Ƌuite a ďad ŵeŵoƌǇ of that tƌip, to ďe hoŶest it 
influenced the whole trip and I think it is the result of the entire media representation 
of us. I can feel that I am facing those issues recently to be honest. I think that as I am 
a student I spend most of my time near the University and the University is a very 
ŵultiĐultuƌal eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt. I doŶ͛t thiŶk I feel the issues ďeĐause eǀeƌǇoŶe is fƌoŵ 
diffeƌeŶt ďaĐkgƌouŶds aŶd plaĐes theƌe.͟  
IVϲ: ͞Yes, ďeĐause I thiŶk that those people [less sophisticated], I am lumping and 
labelling here, there are lots of people who lack education and are not thinking or 
questioning the things they see and read; The Sun, The Daily Mail and so on.. I think 
that they are the people who believe in what the media is saying and then they will 
say it to your face. I have never had these worries or thought when I was at 
University for example, or at a conference with my degree. I have never felt like that 
there but you get it with people from less advantaged backgrounds who are exposed 
to this.͟  
 
Here, many participants, including those who were not fearful, believed that the 
propagation of hostile tabloid rhetoric had the potential to be problematic for their safety, 
due to the ͞tǇpe͟ of audieŶĐe that these sources cater for. Here, participants perceived that 
the tabloid media ǁas pƌiŵaƌilǇ aiŵed at aŶd ĐoŶsuŵed ďǇ a ͞less sophistiĐated͟ audieŶĐe 
who would be more inclined to act upon the narratives contained in such rhetoric. This ͞less 
sophisticated͟ audieŶĐe ǁeƌe ďƌoadlǇ ďelieǀed to ďeloŶg to eleŵeŶts of the iŶdigeŶous 
British working and under-classes. As such, participants believed that such rhetoric would be 
ŵuĐh ŵoƌe ƌeadilǇ aĐĐepted ďǇ ͞less sophistiĐated͟ ŵedia ĐoŶsuŵeƌs ǁho, iŶ tuƌŶ, ǁould 
be more likely to embark upon unprovoked instances of violence, harassment or 
discrimination against recognizable eastern-European migrants:  
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IVϭ: ͞You kŶoǁ, I thiŶk it [iŶflueŶĐe of ƌhetoƌiĐ] depeŶds oŶ ǁhat kiŶd of people Ǉou 
are talking about. If you are talking about someone who is less educated, from a less 
socially privileged background and the only thing they read is the Mirror or the Daily 
Mail, or some other tabloid, I think they would be more willing to just believe what 
they read because they do not question it. When you ask someone who is educated, 
someone with higher education, someone who has learnt about other cultures, I 
think they would be more inclined to question the media and ask who real it is, rather 
than just believing what they are told.͟  
IVϯ: ͞I thiŶk it [iŶflueŶĐe of ƌhetoƌiĐ] depeŶds oŶ the people theŵselǀes, Ǉou kŶoǁ. 
Because they, those tabloids, they target mainly people who are... their readers are 
Ŷot ǀeƌǇ deǀeloped. I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ǁho else ǁould ƌead soŵethiŶg like that to ďe 
hoŶest. AŶd Ǉes, it ĐaŶ affeĐt theŵ aŶd it ŵight. I͛ŵ Ŷot suƌe, ďut I thiŶk the ŵajoƌitǇ 
of the population read these [tabloid] papers. Those are the people who do the most 
haƌŵ, Ŷot the eduĐated aŶd deǀeloped oŶes. TheǇ aƌeŶ͛t the oŶes that ǁill ƌead these 
things and want to stab you in the street or fight you or anything. I think they can be 
ǀeƌǇ easilǇ iŶflueŶĐed ďǇ the Ŷeǁs͟.  
These views were generally held by the majority of participants, however, they appeared to 
have a great deal more bearing on reality for victimized participants. Generally, this widely 
held perception appeared to indicate that most participants of this study, even those who 
had not experienced victimization, had attained a clear, albeit stereotypical, image of those 
whom they perceived to be likely potential aggressors: white, uneducated, working and 
under-class Brits. That said, the data suggests that although these perceptions appear to be 
widely held among participants, they appear to provoke a much more pronounced reaction, 
in the form of anticipated risk avoidance, from participants who were already fearful. Thus, 
while many participants do vaguely consider the potential implications of prevailing media 
narratives, those participants who had actually experienced harassment or discrimination 
were far more concerned about and fearful of such implications, because they felt that their 
experiences clearly reflected how such rhetoric can manifest itself in reality. Furthermore, it 
would also appear that fearful participants also used pre-emptive avoidance techniques in 
order to minimize risk factors that they believed might directly lead to harassment or 
discrimination against them. As such, these findings further indicate that the perceived 
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implications of media rhetoric were largely dependent on the prior experiences of the 
participants in question; those participants who had experienced pronounced harassment 
or discrimination appeared to strongly associate their experience with the propagation of 
rhetoric, whereas those who had not had such experiences considered such narratives to be 
less important.  
4.3 Not experiencing victimization but mindful of rhetoric influence 
So far, the data indicates that previous experience of victimization, which was explicitly 
liŶked to ǀiĐtiŵs͛ foƌeigŶ identity, was the primary factor in fearfulness among participants. 
These participants believed that the core substance of their experience had been a by-
product of anti-immigration rhetoric emanating from sections of the mainstream media. 
However, this group of fearful participants only account for a small number in the total 
sample. As such, the findings derived from these accounts serve to explain how hostile 
media rhetoric had affected the victimized participants in the sample. As such, the impact 
that prominent rhetoric had upon those participants who had not experienced victimization 
or whose experiences had been significantly less severe remains unclear and will therefore 
be further explored in the following section.   
Here, it was certainly the case that some none and less severely victimized participants were 
also concerned about the way in which media rhetoric had broadly demonized them and 
their compatriots. These participants had either not experienced instances of harassment or 
overt discrimination or had experienced less pronounced or less regular instances of 
discrimination, which they believed was linked to the negative image of their nationality. 
These participants felt that the media narrative surrounding eastern-European migration 
had primarily served to highlight their presence to the wider public in almost entirely 
undesirable and problematic contexts. Like their fearful counterparts, these participants 
also felt that such rhetoric might also serve to endorse resentment and hostility towards 
identifiable members of targeted groups in the wider public:  
IVϯ: ͞These thiŶgs [dispaƌagiŶg ŵedia ƌhetoƌiĐ] happeŶ eǀeƌǇǁheƌe to ďe hoŶest. I 
doŶ͛t kŶoǁ, Ǉou haǀe to see theƌe͛s a lot of people ǁho ǁatĐh aŶd see these thiŶgs 
and you have to be aware and take into consideration that they [we] might face 
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some problems after you expose them like that. They are just thinking of their own 
interests rather than thinking of those things that can happen to those people who 
didŶ͛t do aŶǇthiŶg to haƌŵ the; the ŵajority... It [violence] could happen if trends like 
this continue in the future, with the media representation, the situation can get 
ǁoƌse. BasiĐallǇ Ǉou thiŶk of the ǁoƌst Đase sĐeŶaƌio͟. 
IV8: Well first of all it͛s the perceptions they [media] promote. When they first learn 
the fact you are from Eastern Europe people already have something in mind about 
you and I think that for lots of people it is hard to see beyond the opinion they have 
already learned from somewhere else. So I think this can have an effect on them 
because they might face us as being their enemies or competition even though we 
aƌe Ŷot.͟  
The data therefore, indicates that some less severely and non-victimized participants were 
also concerned about the potential implications that mainstream rhetoric could have for the 
safety of themselves and their compatriots. Such accounts also indicate that non-victimized 
participants do consider the prevalence of such media rhetoric to contribute towards 
increased public awareness of the presence of Eastern-European migrants, albeit in an 
almost exclusively negative context that might cultivate imagined grievances and tension. 
Although not explicated, such accounts also suggest that some participants do regard the 
content and prevalence of such media rhetoric as serving to promote and validate prejudice 
toward themselves and their compatriots in the wider public domain. Further, some of 
these participants emphasized the prominent role of the tabloid press in the propagation of 
such narratives, whilst also speculating the potentially aggravating influence that such 
Ŷaƌƌatiǀes ŵight haǀe oŶ the ͞less sophistiĐated͟ audieŶĐes, to ǁhoŵ suĐh outlets 
specifically cater for:  
IVϭ:͟You kŶoǁ, I thiŶk it [iŶflueŶĐe of Ŷaƌƌatives] depends on what kind of people you 
are talking about. If you are talking about someone who is less educated, from a less 
socially privileged background, and the only thing they read is the Mirror or some 
other tabloid, I think they would be more willing to just believe what they read 
because they do not question it. When you ask someone who is educated, someone 
with higher education, who has been around and learnt about other cultures, I think 
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they would be more inclined to question the media and ask just how real it is and not 
ďelieǀe eǀeƌǇthiŶg theǇ aƌe told͟.  
IVϯ: ͞I thiŶk it [iŶflueŶĐe of Ŷaƌƌatiǀes] depeŶds oŶ the people theŵselǀes, Ǉou kŶoǁ. 
Because they, those tabloids, they target mainly people who are... their readers are 
Ŷot ǀeƌǇ… deǀeloped. I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ǁho else ǁould ƌead soŵethiŶg like that to ďe 
hoŶest. AŶd Ǉes, it ĐaŶ affeĐt theŵ aŶd it ŵight. I͛ŵ Ŷot suƌe, ďut it ŵight ďe the 
majority of people, a large percentage of the population that read it. Those are the 
people who do the most harm, Ŷot the eduĐated aŶd deǀeloped oŶes. TheǇ aƌeŶ͛t the 
ones who will read these things and want to stab you in the street or fight you or 
aŶǇthiŶg. I thiŶk theǇ ĐaŶ ǀeƌǇ easilǇ ďe iŶflueŶĐed ďǇ the Ŷeǁs͟.  
IVϲ:͟ I thiŶk it [iŶflueŶĐe of Ŷaƌƌatiǀes] depeŶds. If I did not question it then I would 
just ďelieǀe the Ŷeǁspapeƌs, ƌight. “o foƌ eǆaŵple, Ǉou ƌead the Ŷeǁspapeƌ aŶd it͛s 
about the bad Polish people coming here and robbing houses at midnight and you 
believe it, what happens? You start to look at every single person who fits that image 
aŶd put theŵ iŶ a ďoǆ. You doŶ͛t look at theŵ as iŶdiǀiduals; Ǉou look at eǀeƌǇ Polish 
peƌsoŶ as a ďad peƌsoŶ that Đoŵes heƌe to do ĐeƌtaiŶ ďad thiŶgs. That͛s the pƌoďleŵ 
of the media, lots of people read these things and take it on face value and believe 
it͟.  
For some of these participants, the sources and target audiences of this rhetoric was also a 
cause for reflection and some concern.  These participants also appeared to believe that 
such media rhetoric would be much more widely accepted among members of less 
advantaged social classes. Here, the majority of participants also believed that the rhetoric 
ĐoŶtaiŶed iŶ ŵedia souƌĐes, ǁhiĐh Đateƌ toǁaƌds ͞less sophistiĐated͟ audieŶĐes, ǁas ŵoƌe 
likely to be readily accepted bǇ theiƌ ƌeadeƌs thaŶ ǁould ďe the Đase ǁith a ͞ŵoƌe 
sophistiĐated͟ audieŶĐe. Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, iŶ this Ŷeǆus, paƌtiĐipaŶts felt that if uŶ-critically 
ĐoŶsuŵed, suĐh Ŷaƌƌatiǀes ŵight ďe applied ďǇ ͞less sophistiĐated͟ audieŶĐes to ǀalidate 
prejudice against persons belonging to, or perceived to belong to, the groups targeted by 
this rhetoric. Heƌe, these paƌtiĐipaŶts ǁeƌe eǆpƌessiŶg a feaƌ of ďeiŶg ͞otheƌed͟ ďǇ the 
populist tabloid press and the potential impact that this could lead to if taken on face value.  
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Less severely and non-victimized participants also believed that the way in which they and 
their compatriots were being portrayed had been greatly exaggerated for dramatic effect. 
These participants also believed that these sources were intentionally producing largely 
inaccurate representations of their respective nations and of their individual motives for 
moving to the UK by broadly implying dishonest ulterior motives to their nationality as a 
whole. Some participants believed that this was largely the result of intentionally biased 
media reporting which is primarily concerned with spreading populist anti-immigration 
narratives for political purposes. Here, some participants felt that tabloid rhetoric sources 
had purposefully adopted an overly critical blanket view of Eastern-European migrants 
which had unfairly tarnished the reputations of these groups as a whole. These participants 
felt that such sources disproportionately sought to highlight cases of deviance and 
criminality among their compatriots in order to give credence to the stereotypical image of 
the ͞deǀiaŶt EasteƌŶ-EuƌopeaŶ͟. “oŵe of these paƌtiĐipaŶts also felt that the suspiĐioŶ that 
such narratives would produce could be counter-productive to their own and their 
Đoŵpatƌiots͛ settleŵeŶt aŶd iŶtegration into their new communities and, as such, their 
acceptance into wider society. Although the reasoning for such perceptions was not 
explicated, one might consider that such issues of integration could be aggravated by the 
hostile and problematizing nature the narratives contained in such rhetoric. Furthermore, if 
the hostilitǇ aŶd suspiĐioŶ eǆpƌessed iŶ Ŷaƌƌatiǀes that speĐifiĐallǇ highlight ͞pƌoďleŵatiĐ͟ 
groups become reciprocated at a community level then migrants belonging to or perceived 
to belong to ͞pƌoďleŵatiĐ͟ gƌoups ŵight ďeĐoŵe eǆposed to iŶstaŶĐes of ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ ďased 
alienation and isolation, harassment, vandalism and even violence: 
 IVϲ: ͞I like to folloǁ this Ŷeǁs, Ǉes. I like to ƌead it aŶd ĐƌitiĐise… It͛s just fiŶgeƌ 
pointing and blaming; ͞oh it͛s theŵ, theǇ aƌe ƌespoŶsiďle͟, I ŵeaŶ us; iŵŵigƌaŶts 
from Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, these countries. They try to picture us as people 
who come to their country trying to take their jobs, take their money, benefits, 
everything. But the reality is totally different but nobody is looking at it. All they do is 
ďlaŵe, ďlaŵe, ďlaŵe. It͛s the saŵe iŶ politiĐs too.͟ 
IVϵ:͟ This is Ŷot tƌue. Yes, ǁe as ‘oŵaŶiaŶ͛s, ǁe ǁaŶt to iŶtegƌate aŶd studǇ. I kŶoǁ 
many people from back home who are living, studying and working in the UK. They 
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ǁaŶt to iŶtegƌate ďut the ŵedia aŶd the politiĐiaŶs, theǇ doŶ͛t let us. TheǇ aƌe tƌǇiŶg 
to seŶd us ďaĐk to ‘oŵaŶia.͟  
IVϭϬ:͟Well I ǁas eǆpeĐtiŶg theŵ Ŷot to ďash ouƌ ĐouŶtƌies foƌ little thiŶgs. You kŶoǁ, 
if for example someone British does soŵe Đƌiŵe it͛s Ŷot as ďig a deal as if soŵe 
BulgaƌiaŶ oƌ ‘oŵaŶiaŶ did it. It͛s like theǇ fiŶd the eǆĐeptioŶs aŶd tƌǇ to ŵake it iŶto 
a geŶeƌal ƌule. You doŶ͛t do that.͟ 
 
For some of these participants, the experience of tension and marginalization had been very 
real and not just a hypothetical prospect as it was for most of their counterparts. The data 
here suggests that those participants who had experienced instances of overt harassment 
and discrimination did appear to conflate their experiences with the dominance of hostile 
media rhetoric. The data also indicates that those participants who experienced recurring 
instances of more innocuous covert discrimination also appeared to conflate the two issues. 
As such, the data thus far indicates that experiences of varying degrees of harassment and 
discrimination are the primary factor in participants FoC, not rhetoric. Furthermore, the 
data also suggests that severely and less severely victimized participants do perceive a link 
between their experiences and media rhetoric. However, it would seem that it was 
paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ diƌeĐt liǀed eǆpeƌieŶĐes of ǀiĐtiŵizatioŶ, iŶ ĐoŶjuŶĐtioŶ ǁith the pƌeǀaleŶĐe of 
rhetoric, which informed their fearful responses. The exact configuration of this perceived 
link still remains unclear. However, the data does clearly indicate a link between these 
paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ ǀaƌǇiŶg eǆpeƌieŶĐes of haƌassŵeŶt aŶd/oƌ discrimination, FoC and hostile 
media rhetoric.   
4.4 Political rhetoric 
WheŶ it Đaŵe to disĐussiŶg paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ peƌĐeptioŶs of UKIP aŶd the perceived significance 
of their rhetoric, it quickly became apparent that most of these participants, fearful and 
non-fearful, were largely uninterested in politics. As such, these participants were largely 
uninformed about UKIP, their apparent growing public support or their rhetoric: 
IVϵ: ͞No, I͛ŵ soƌƌǇ, I doŶ͛t ƌeallǇ kŶoǁ ŵuĐh aďout theŵ ;UKIPͿ.͟ 
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IVϭϮ: ͞I ŵight ďe the ǁƌoŶg peƌsoŶ to ask ďeĐause I do Ŷot folloǁ politiĐs. I doŶ͛t 
follow it at all, ďut I ǁill saǇ that I kŶoǁ this paƌtǇ ;UKIPͿ ǁaŶt out of the EU.͟ 
These paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ aĐĐouŶts theƌefoƌe offeƌed ǀeƌǇ little iŶ teƌŵs sheddiŶg light oŶ ǁhetheƌ 
the prevalence of such politiĐal ƌhetoƌiĐ ĐaŶ affeĐt ŵigƌaŶts͛ peƌĐeptioŶs of FoC. However, 
the fact that these participants are not aware of UKIP and their targeted rhetoric could 
suggest that this form of rhetoric is not as severe or far-reaching as the researcher originally 
supposed. Accounts from more politically aware participants appear to suggest a mixed 
response to political rhetoric and the potential implications it might entail for them. 
Fuƌtheƌŵoƌe, soŵe of these paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ aĐĐouŶts appeaƌed to iŶdiĐate a laĐk distiŶĐtioŶ 
between political and media rhetoric, in this regard:  
IVϲ: ͞TheǇ tƌǇ to piĐtuƌe us as people ǁho Đoŵe to theiƌ ĐouŶtƌǇ to take theiƌ joďs, 
take their money, benefits and everything, but the reality is totally different. Nobody 
is lookiŶg at this. All theǇ do is ďlaŵe ďlaŵe ďlaŵe, aŶd Ǉou kŶoǁ, it͛s ǀeƌǇ siŵilar to 
the politiĐs ďut I aŵ guessiŶg ǁe ǁill talk aďout that lateƌ͟.  
IVϵ:͟ This is Ŷot tƌue. Yes, ǁe as ‘oŵaŶiaŶs, ǁe ǁaŶt to iŶtegƌate aŶd studǇ. I kŶoǁ 
many people from back home who are living, studying and working in the UK. They 
want to integrate but the ŵedia aŶd the politiĐiaŶs, theǇ doŶ͛t let us. TheǇ aƌe tƌǇiŶg 
to seŶd us ďaĐk to ‘oŵaŶia.͟  
 
“uĐh aĐĐouŶts suggest that these paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ ǀieǁ the positioŶs of, aŶd ƌoles plaǇed ďǇ 
political and media rhetoric, to be synonymous with one another due to the similar nature 
of their underlying narrative. Thus, these accounts indicated that, due to the similar tones of 
these two sources of rhetoric, participants believe that these sources capacity to promote 
aŶd ǀalidate pƌejudiĐe aŶd hostilitǇ aŵoŶg ͞less sophistiĐated͟ audieŶĐes is similar: 
IVϯ: ͞Yeah, I fiƌst heaƌd of theŵ, I thiŶk it ǁas last Ǉeaƌ oƌ soŵethiŶg, aƌouŶd ǁheŶ 
they gained more popularity in the EU elections because they were emphasizing the 
negative impacts of immigration, and, as I said before, it can influence other people 
who are less educated. I think that this is their main market, where they can gain 
ǀotes͟.  
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“iŵilaƌlǇ, otheƌ paƌtiĐipaŶts also peƌĐeiǀed a diƌeĐt liŶk ďetǁeeŶ ͞less sophistiĐated͟ aŶd 
socially disadvantaged media audiences and those likely to be UKIP supporters, suggesting 
that they were one and the same. However, these participants stopped short of claiming an 
exclusive association between͟less sophistiĐated͟ audieŶĐes aŶd ƌhetoƌiĐ appeal; ĐitiŶg 
theiƌ aǁaƌeŶess of ͞sophistiĐated͟ Euƌo-critics and UKIP supporters and the pervasive 
subjectivity of personal political preference. This, however, appears to further suggest that 
these participants do at least consider the two forms of rhetoric, and the implications they 
might relate to, to be linked. However, this data does not clearly suggest that these 
participants consider increased public support for UKIP to be an indicator of an increased 
likelihood of targeted crime against themselves or causing FoC: 
IVϲ: ͞People [UKIP voters].. People who are unemployed, people living on the state 
welfare, people living on the council estates, you know. I think uneducated people 
who lack essential skills and education. But on the other hand, you have some very 
intelligent people who really do not see a future for the UK in the European Union. 
But I think they will mainly get support from people who read the tabloids and 
ďelieǀe theiƌ stoƌies͟.   
 
Other participants appeared to consider UKIP primarily in a political context. Here, it was 
ĐoŶsideƌed that UKIP͛s poteŶtial politiĐal suĐĐess iŶ the GeŶeƌal EleĐtioŶ ǁould haǀe ŵaiŶlǇ 
political and institutional implications for them, such as visa and employment difficulties, 
rather than potentially validating and perpetuating discrimination or targeted harassment 
against themselves: 
IVϲ: ͞I doŶ͛t thiŶk I aŵ sĐaƌed [aďout iŶĐƌeased suppoƌt of UKIP]. If theǇ ǁiŶ theǇ 
ĐaŶ͛t just kiĐk ŵe out of the ĐouŶtƌǇ. I haǀe ďeeŶ heƌe ϲ Ǉeaƌs Ŷoǁ, aŶd I haǀe Ϯ 
degrees, so anytime I want to do it I can just applǇ foƌ Bƌitish ĐitizeŶship.͟  
 
As such, this data suggests that even the most fearful participants did not appear to directly 
conflate a potential UKIP majority government and the public views this would reflect as 
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being a cause for FoC, but rather an administrational issue that could be negated through 
the proper channels. In any case, this account appears to indicate that even in the case of 
such an event this particular participant would not consider leaving the country of out 
fearfulness.  
 
Thus far, the data does not indicate a clear relationship between political rhetoric and FoC 
among participants. On the contrary, it appears to indicate that participants are less 
concerned about the prevalence of this particular form of rhetoric and its potential 
implications than that which emanates from the MSM. However, further data indicates that 
some participants were fearful of the prospect of a successful UKIP election campaign 
culminating in the formation of a government, rather than the actual rhetoric they espouse:  
IVϭ:͟ Oh Ǉes, I aŵ afƌaid of that happeŶiŶg [UKIP GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt]. ‘eallǇ afƌaid. I aŵ 
worried. I almost start to tell myself that they are going to win. They are so popular 
and as we were saying before, there seem to be so many people who share their 
ǀieǁs. It͛s ǀeƌǇ sĐaƌǇ.͟ 
IVϯ:͟ TheǇ [UKIP] didŶ͛t get theƌe ďǇ theŵselǀes aŶd its Ƌuite disappoiŶtiŶg ǁheŶ Ǉou 
thiŶk that the ŵajoƌitǇ, ǁell, let͛s Ŷot saǇ a ŵajoƌitǇ ďut lots of people ďelieǀe iŶ theiƌ 
plan so it might well be scary for the General Election because who knows what will 
happeŶ… If theǇ ǁeƌe to ǁiŶ, it ǁould ďe sĐaƌǇ foƌ us aŶd ǁe ŵight haǀe to 
recalculate our future in this country. They might kick us out. Who knows what might 
happen. But as I say, first of all you think of the worst case sĐeŶaƌio. It ĐaŶ͛t ďe good 
fƌoŵ ouƌ poiŶt of ǀieǁ if theǇ ǁiŶ. ͞ 
 
These accounts indicate that these participants were concerned and even fearful of the 
prospect of a UKIP government and the potential consequences that this would entail for 
them as new EU migrants. These participants appeared to perceive that the anti-
iŵŵigƌatioŶ ƌhetoƌiĐ, ǁhiĐh foƌŵs the fouŶdatioŶ of UKIP͛s eleĐtioŶ ŵaŶifesto, ŵight ďe 
sufficiently popular among the voting public for them to form a Government capable of 
implementing policies that would reflect these latent sentiments. Here, the data appears to 
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suggest that these participants were primarily concerned about the implications that the 
formation of such a government would have on their ability to stay in the UK, rather than 
how the dissemination of such rhetoric at an institutional level might lead to targeted 
victimization.  Whether or not these participants believed a UKIP government would entail 
increased instances of targeted crime or harassment remains quite ambiguous, however, 
further investigation of these perceptions appeared to reveal something of a cognitive 
dichotomy: 
IVϭ: ͞MaǇďe, it ŵight ďe [a peƌsoŶal safetǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶ]. But ďeĐause ǁe do Ŷot ƌeallǇ 
make a distinction from others, I mean, because we are not visible you cannot just 
spot a Romanian, Bulgarian or Pole from a crowd. There is not a real distinction 
ďetǁeeŶ us iŶ the saŵe ǁaǇ theƌe is foƌ otheƌ gƌoups [BlaĐk aŶd AsiaŶ]. It͛s ǀeƌǇ 
unlikely we will be bullied or attacked, but I think it is a problem when people find out 
ouƌ ŶatioŶalitǇ. I thiŶk it ďeĐoŵes a pƌoďleŵ theŶ.͟ 
 
In this regard, the data suggests that although participants do recognize the potentially 
inflammatory nature of such rhetoric (media and political) and have even experienced 
marginalization or harassment which they believed was informed by these prevailing 
messages, they were also aware that, due to their Caucasian appearance, such incidents 
required a trigger or tell that broadcasted their foreignness to potential aggressors. Thus, 
the data therefore indicates that, although participants were concerned about the potential 
formation of a UKIP government and the inflammatory images on which their rhetoric is 
based, their concern did not appear to simultaneously extend to anticipated instances of 
targeted crime against them due to the clandestine nature of their foreignness. This would 
appeaƌ to ďe a keǇ eǆteŶuatiŶg faĐtoƌ iŶ soŵe paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ appaƌeŶt laĐk of feaƌfulŶess aŶd 
will be discussed at further length in the following analysis of non-feaƌful paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ 
accounts. Furthermore, the data presented above indicates that although participants were 
concerned about, and even overstated the extent of public support for UKIP, they did not 
appear to equate the imagined prevalence of this support with an increased likelihood of 
being victimized because of their nationality.  
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Thus, the data would appear to indicate that although fearful participants did seem to 
conflate their experiences of harassment or discrimination with media rhetoric, the 
evidence regarding political rhetoric and FoC is much less conclusive due to a number of 
possible factors: 1) participants may have conflated media and political rhetoric together 
when discussing the former, thus parallel conclusions could be drawn from the former 
accounts, 2) participants recognize that their clandestine foreign identity affords them 
protection from potential aggressors or harassers. As such, the data has led to inconclusive 
findings that do appear to indicate a relationship between explicit rhetoric and minor 
concerns about targeted victimization, however, the precise workings of this relationship 
remains unclear. Furthermore, the data indicates that direct first-hand experience of 
harassment or discrimination is the key factor in fearful participants FoC.  
 
4.5 The ͞ŶoŶ-feaƌful͟ gƌoup 
As pƌeǀiouslǇ Ŷoted, ĐoŶtƌaƌǇ to the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ͛s oƌigiŶal hǇpothesis, the fiŶdiŶgs of this 
study suggest that the majority of participants were not affected by anti-Eastern European 
media and political rhetoric to the extent that it provoked an acute experience of FoC. A 
number of possible mitigating factors are explored and discussed in order to better 
understand what influences participants perceptions of FoC in relation to the proliferation 
of hostile media and political rhetoric that explicitly targets them.   
4.6 Not experiencing harassment or discrimination.  
As discussed previously, the majority of participants were largely aware of nature and 
prevalence of media rhetoric. Further, these participants were also aware that such rhetoric 
was heavily invested in depicting and giving credence to broad undesirable stereotypes of 
Eastern-European migrants. Despite being aware of the targeted nature of such rhetoric, 
the majority of participants were not fearful that it might provoke or validate instances of 
harassment or discrimination against them:  
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IVϯ: ͞It [taƌgeted haƌassŵeŶt] ŵight ďe [a ĐoŶĐeƌŶ], Ǉou haǀe to take this iŶto 
consideration. I have never felt I could face something like this due to my status as an 
immigrant. Sure it might happen because, I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ, people aƌe dƌuŶk iŶ the 
stƌeets oƌ oŶ dƌugs, ďut that Đould happeŶ to ŵe oƌ Ǉou.͟ 
IVϰ: ͞It [ŵedia Ŷaƌƌatiǀes] doesŶ͛t affeĐt ŵe too ŵuĐh to ďe hoŶest. I haŶg out ǁith 
people ǁho aĐĐept ŵe foƌ ǁho I aŵ, theǇ doŶ͛t geŶeƌalize. If soŵeoŶe Đalls me a 
Gypsy and makes all these stereotypical accusations about me, I just ignore them. 
TheǇ aƌe Ŷot ǁoƌth ŵǇ tiŵe oƌ effoƌt͟. 
IVϴ: ͞ Mŵŵ, Ŷot ƌeallǇ [eǆpeƌieŶĐe Ŷaƌƌatiǀe ŵaŶifestatioŶ]. It͛s fuŶŶǇ. WheŶeǀeƌ I 
go out and meet new people and they hear my accent and ask where I am from, 
sometimes I say Romania and most of them talk about Dracula and Transylvania. 
TheǇ oŶlǇ kŶoǁ us ďeĐause of these thiŶgs aŶd that͛s okaǇ. But otheƌs ŵight look at 
ŵe aŶd saǇ ͞GǇpsǇ͟. “oŵetiŵes I get ǀeƌǇ pissed off aďout this͟.  
 
Contrary to the research hypothesis, the data suggest that, despite being aware of the 
stigmatized status of their nationality, the majority of participants in this study either did 
not, or had not been prompted, to seriously consider a direct link between media rhetoric 
and targeted harassment or hostility. Although participants were very much aware of the 
stigma that purveyed their nationality, they did not feel that this was to a level sufficient 
enough to provoke arbitrary instances of targeted victimization. Participants were, however, 
aware of and had experienced the less severe repercussions that might be linked such 
narratives, namely unwelcome associations with and accusations of being Roma gypsies, 
which had tended to occurred upon the revelation of their nationality to new 
acquaintances. Here, the majority of participants appeared to be more concerned about the 
broad associations between them and ethnic Roma than potential instances of rhetoric 
inspired harassment or violence. 
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One possible explanation as to why participants were dismissive of and unconcerned about 
potential instances of narrative influenced violence could lie in the fact that none of these 
participants, or anyone they knew, had had the misfortune of experiencing this phenomena 
first-hand. Although non-fearful participants may have experienced more innocuous 
incidents related to their nationality, these instances lacked the severity or consistency to 
illicit a fearful response, rather than a benign annoyance conveyed in their accounts. As 
such, despite the proliferation of such problematizing rhetoric, the data appears to indicate 
that paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ ƌeal ǁoƌld eǆpeƌieŶĐes aƌe keǇ iŶ iŶflueŶĐiŶg theiƌ peƌĐeptioŶs of thƌeat or 
FoC and how these are linked to prominent rhetoric. Here, non-feaƌful paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ 
experiences appear to indicate to them that the potential threat of rhetoric inspired 
violence or aggression is negligible at best, and therefore unworthy of genuine concern. 
Having not experienced victimization that could be perceived as being linked to rhetoric 
hostility, these participants had no reason to be fearful of the prospect of rhetoric driven 
Đƌiŵe.  OŶ the ĐoŶtƌaƌǇ, the data iŶdiĐates that the ŵajoƌitǇ of paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ eǆpeƌieŶces had 
been quite the opposite of those proposed in the hypothesis of the current study. 
4.7 Positive experiences alleviating concerns 
Here, the data indicates that, despite being aware of the prevalence of such rhetoric, the 
majority of participants had actually enjoyed mostly positive experiences and interactions 
with the local and student populations, during their time in the UK: 
IVϭϮ: ͞Yes, Ǉes [I felt ǁelĐoŵe]. I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ǁhetheƌ I aŵ luĐkǇ oƌ ǁhetheƌ it͛s just 
the people I know or what. But the people I know in the UK, the English people, they 
never ever showed any kind of discrimination or concerns about my nationality or 
that I might behave differently in certain situations. I never felt that from people. I 
doŶ͛t thiŶk I eǀeƌ ŵet aŶǇ disĐƌiŵiŶatioŶ ďeĐause of ŵǇ ŶatioŶalitǇ. The oŶlǇ issue I 
had ǁas Ŷot haǀiŶg a ŶatioŶal iŶsuƌaŶĐe Ŷuŵďeƌ͟.  
It would appear that these constructive experiences may have served to alleviate any 
concerns that participants may have had previously concerning rhetoric and targeted 
hostility or victimization. As such, most participants were content with their overall 
experiences of the UK and their interactions with its inhabitants, whilst also feeling 
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reassured that these experiences better reflected the reality of the wider acceptance of 
Eastern-European migrants into the local community and wider British society than what 
prevailing narratives would appear to suggest. 
 
It was also the case that some newer student participants, whom were less acculturated 
than many of their counterparts, had expressed genuine fears about their safety and how 
they would be received in the UK prior to their actual arrival:  
IVϴ: ͞I kŶeǁ theƌe ŵight ďe soŵe disĐƌiŵiŶatioŶ ďut I asked soŵe fƌieŶds ǁho ǁeƌe 
studying in London and they told me it was bullshit. They said there was no 
discrimination going on. I felt really good. When I got here it felt like home because 
there were people that welcomed me and made me not feel lonely or anything, you 
know. I was afraid at first. It was the first time I moved out from home and it was to 
a foreign country, one where we were supposed to get discriminated against. I was 
afƌaid aŶd I ǁas suƌpƌised ǁheŶ it didŶ͛t happeŶ. It just felt ƌight.͟  
These ĐoŶĐeƌŶs ǁeƌe diƌeĐtlǇ ƌelated to these paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ aǁaƌeŶess of the peƌĐeiǀed 
hostility and intolerance that was being broadly projected towards their nationality in 
contemporary media and political rhetoric. Here, the data indicates that these fears were 
alleviated by reassuring second-hand accounts from compatriots already living in the UK, as 
well as by their own reassuring lived experiences during their stay in the country. 
Furthermore, the data suggests that the positive experiences of these participants and, to 
some extent, the conferred positive experiences of their compatriots, serve to mitigate any 
preconceived concerns about their safety and acceptance. 
 
Consistent with the previous literature, acculturation also emerged as a factor that may 
have served to alleviate soŵe paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs. Here, the data would appear to 
indicate that participants who had resided in the UK for the longest periods of time without 
experiencing harassment or discrimination were also among the least fearful: 
IVϭϬ: ͞Well, at fiƌst it [dispaƌagiŶg Ŷaƌƌatiǀes] ǁas upsettiŶg, of Đouƌse. But afteƌ a 
ǁhile, I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ, I doŶ͛t ideŶtifǇ ŵǇself ǁith the people theǇ shoǁ oŶ those shoǁs 
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oƌ iŶ the papeƌs. I͛ŵ Ŷot like theŵ so.. I ǁould saǇ I ǁas upset at fiƌst ďut I got over it. 
I ǁouldŶ͛t saǇ it ƌeallǇ gets to ŵe ďeĐause I haǀe ďeeŶ heƌe so loŶg aŶd I haǀe 
adapted. I feel at hoŵe. I haǀe Ǉouƌ ǁaǇ of saǇiŶg aŶd doiŶg thiŶgs. I doŶ͛t feel like 
an outsider. I did for the first few months, it was difficult at times but I am really 
Đoŵfoƌtaďle Ŷoǁ͟. 
In this regard, these participants felt that their extended length of stay and the additional 
integration it had afforded them had somehow moderated the impact that they had felt 
from prevailing targeted narratives. The data would therefore appear to suggest that, 
although these paƌtiĐipaŶts ŵaǇ haǀe iŶitiallǇ felt ͞otheƌed͟ oƌ ĐoŶĐeƌŶed aďout their status 
due to media and political rhetoric, the longer they remained unexposed to explicit 
indications of the aggravating influence of rhetoric, the more accepted and less fearful they 
felt. Thus, because these participants felt they had been able to adapt well to their adoptive 
society, whilst also not experiencing instances of harassment or discrimination, they no 
longer regarded theŵselǀes as eǆteƌŶal ͞otheƌs͟ ďut ƌatheƌ as Ŷatuƌalized.   
 
Wheƌeas feaƌful paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐes of haƌassŵeŶt had giǀeŶ theŵ seƌious Đause foƌ 
concern, regarding the influence of rhetoric upoŶ ͞less-sophistiĐated͟ readers, non-fearful 
participants were far more assured of the tolerance and tactfulness of the wider British 
public. As such, non-feaƌful paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ positiǀe eǆpeƌieŶĐes, oƌ aďseŶĐe of Ŷegatiǀe oŶes, 
have given them less cause for concern about the possible inflammatory influence of such 
rhetoric than had been the case for their fearful counterparts: 
IVϰ: ͞To ďe ĐoŵpletelǇ hoŶest, I haǀe Ŷeǀeƌ ŵet soŵeoŶe ǁho is… I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ, 
brutally racist about me or telling me that I am x, y and z. This is probably why I am 
not affected because so far I have only met genuine people here at University. I 
worked for 12 months at a UK company with very nice people and I think I realized 
that British people are quite well educated, so even if they do adopt these views they 
are ŵoƌe taĐtful aďout it. TheǇ ǁoŶ͛t just ƌead soŵethiŶg aŶd theŶ fƌeak out aďout 
it͟. 
IVϴ: ͞Not ƌeallǇ, Ŷo [ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aďout iŶflueŶĐe of Ŷaƌƌatiǀes]. I thiŶk that people aƌe 
ŵuĐh ŵoƌe opeŶ ŵiŶded thaŶ theǇ seeŵ. EǀeƌǇoŶe that I ŵet heƌe didŶ͛t saǇ 
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anything. TheǇ ǁeƌe just like, ͞oh ‘oŵaŶia, ǁheƌe is that͟. TheǇ didŶ͛t haǀe aŶǇ 
preconceptions or anything. We even had jokes about it; me and my housemates, we 
aƌe ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ haǀiŶg jokes aďout it ďeĐause theǇ didŶ͛t saǇ aŶǇthiŶg oƌ judge ŵe iŶ 
the first place, theǇ doŶ͛t judge aŶǇďodǇ.͟  
The views held by these participants also appeared to have been influenced by a range of 
constructive experiences between them and the wider public. These participants appeared 
to consider that these experiences were generally representative of the wider public and 
that they demonstrated just how insignificant these kiŶds͛ rhetorical narratives are in 
shaping individual and public sentiments. As such, these participants were mostly dismissive 
of the notion that the current climate of hostile rhetoric might serve to provoke hostility or 
violence towards them simply because of their nationality. Furthermore, of these 
participants, some believed that even if it were the case that such narratives did cause 
disparaging or bigoted views among the wider public, these views would be much more 
likely to present themselves in more covert, rather than overt, forms. The data therefore 
suggests that, based upon such experiences, these participants consider that the probability 
of experiencing crime, which is directly related to the stigmatized position of their 
nationality, is negligible and therefore not of serious concern. These findings further 
indicate the significaŶĐe of paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐe/iŶeǆpeƌieŶĐe of victimization in shaping 
their perceptions of FoC and the influence of rhetoric.    
 
From the collection of data above it would appear that, despite living in the UK during a 
period of outward hostility towards them in prevailing political and media narrative, the 
majority of participants have simply not been exposed to any experiences that would 
indicate to them that their nationality could be hazardous to their personal safety in the 
current climate. On the contrary, their accounts appear to indicate that, despite some 
having preconceived fears of the discrimination, which were influenced by current anti-
immigration climate, the lived experiences of these participants were quite the opposite and 
thus served to alleviate such fears.  
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4.8 DefleĐtioŶ of ƌhetoƌiĐ sĐope oŶto ǁoƌthǇ ͚otheƌs͛ (Roma) 
Another factor that arose from the data was that Romanian and Bulgarian participants were 
very keen to point out that the real primary targets of media and political rhetoric were not 
them, nor their ethnic counterparts, but rather Roma Gypsies. This was a distinction which 
many participants were also keen to underline and thus suggests a cognitive disassociation 
between the two groups. It was posited that, although contemporary narratives did broadly 
encompass all Romanians and Bulgarians, the real intended targets of these narratives were 
in fact the Roma, which many added was for good reason. These participants considered the 
Roma to be an entirely distinct ethnic and cultural group in their respective societies which 
are largely responsible for a considerable proportion of the deviance and criminality, which 
according to some sources of rhetoric, is endemic among Eastern-Europeans.  
 
Here, it was the view of a considerable proportion of fearful and non-fearful participants 
alike that the Roma and their prolific criminal and deviant conduct were simultaneously the 
actual sources and intended targets of the media and political rhetoric which has come to 
broadly encompass all Romanians and Bulgarians in contemporary rhetorical discourse:  
 
IVϭ: ͞OfteŶ ǁheŶ Ǉou see the ‘oŵaŶiaŶ ĐoŵŵuŶities͛ ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ ǁithiŶ the 
media they are referring to gypsies, but they never make that distinction. You know, 
theǇ doŶ͛t eǀeƌ ŵake that distiŶĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ ouƌ [‘oŵaŶiaŶ] Đultuƌe aŶd GǇpsǇ 
culture. They just put us all in the same pot and I believe this is unfair because they 
aƌe tǁo ǀeƌǇ distiŶĐt ďaĐkgƌouŶds, Đultuƌes aŶd ŵeŶtalities.͟  
IVϵ:͟ We do Ŷot like the GǇpsies, geŶeƌallǇ. Although I haǀe fƌieŶds ǁho aƌe gǇpsies, 
they are normal people, but we do not like them as a group because they go outside 
of our country and pretend to be Romanians and it is quite shameful the kind of 
things they do [crime & deviance]. Because of their actions we are all viewed in this 
ǁaǇ͟.  
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IVϭϮ: ͞He [Nigel Faƌage] ǁeŶt to Bulgaƌia aŶd filŵed only Gypsies and then said that 
is what we all do. There were no Bulgarians in this film. Yes we are a poor country but 
Ǉou doŶ͛t Ŷeed to dƌag us all thƌough the ŵud. It͛s a ďeautiful ĐouŶtƌǇ ďut he oŶlǇ 
wants to see the Gypsies so he could paint this pictuƌe of us͟.  
As such, although these participants did recognize the limited legitimacy of the concerns 
which are intertwined media and political rheotric, they did not associate themselves or 
their self-identified ethnic group with those upon whom such narratives are focused:  
 
IVϭϬ:͟ I just doŶ͛t ideŶtifǇ ŵǇself ǁith those people theǇ displaǇ oŶ those shoǁs aŶd 
iŶ the papeƌs aŶd ǁhateǀeƌ else. I aŵ Ŷot like theŵ, so… I ǁould saǇ that I ǁas upset 
at first but then I get over it. Even though they talk badly about Romanians and stuff, 
I just doŶ͛t feel like the taƌget of that. If Ǉou ǁeƌe to put ŵe Ŷeǆt to oŶe of theŵ 
[‘oŵa] I ǁould ĐleaƌlǇ ďe diffeƌeŶt iŶ teƌŵs of hoǁ I look, talk aŶd ďehaǀe.͟  
 
The data therefore indicates that, although the distinctions between the Roma and other 
Eastern European ethnic groups are neglected within these broadly encompassing 
narratives, the vast majority of participants in the current study do not genuinely consider 
themselves, or the group they identify with, to be intended primary targets of this rhetoric. 
Rather, these participants consider themselves to be innocent secondary victims of this 
rhetoric which, either negligently or purposefully, fails to recognize the distinction between 
theiƌ aŶd the legitiŵate ͞otheƌs͟ ƌespective cultural and ethnic identities. As such, the data 
suggests that these participants are, to varying degrees, able to detach themselves from the 
haďituallǇ deǀiaŶt aŶd ĐƌiŵiŶal ͞otheƌs͟ that aƌe poƌtƌaǇed iŶ aŶd oďjeĐted to iŶ this 
rhetoric. Furthermore, this might suggest that this detachment also means that these 
participants are largely unconcerned about the possible harassment or aggression that may 
ďe tƌiggeƌed ďǇ aŶǇ ǀague assoĐiatioŶ that theǇ haǀe ǁith these legitiŵate ͞otheƌs͟. As 
such, one might speculate the significance of this particular factor in explaining the 
unexpectedly low levels of FoC experienced by the majority of participants in this study 
despite the climate of mainstream xenophobia that broadly incorporates them by merit of 
their nationality.   
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4.9 Hidden ethnicity and demographic diversity. 
One possibly significant reason for why most participants are not be experiencing 
harassment or discrimination related to their maligned nationalities might lie in their 
physical appearance/ethnicity. In terms of appearance, the vast majority of participants in 
this study were Caucasian and as such would be almost impossible to identify them as being 
of foreign origin from their physical appearance alone, let alone their specific country of 
origin: 
IVϭ: ͞MaǇďe, it ŵight ďe [a peƌsoŶal safetǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶ]. But ďeĐause ǁe do Ŷot ƌeallǇ 
make a distinctions from others, I mean, because we are not visible, you cannot just 
spot a Romanian, Bulgarian or Pole from a crowd. There is not a real distinction 
betǁeeŶ us iŶ the saŵe ǁaǇ theƌe is foƌ otheƌ gƌoups [BlaĐk aŶd AsiaŶ]. It͛s ǀeƌǇ 
unlikely we will be bullied or attacked, but I think it is a problem when people find out 
ouƌ ŶatioŶalitǇ. I thiŶk it ďeĐoŵes a pƌoďleŵ theŶ.͟ 
This particular factor represents something of a major stumbling block for those who might 
be motivated by rhetoric to seek out and target individuals who belong to groups with 
which such narratives are specifically focused. As such, the only feature that really 
distinguishes these participants from the wider host demographic are their accents, and 
even these varied in thickness from one individual to the next. Furthermore, based upon 
their previous experiences of victimization, fearful participants had identified the 
recognisability of their foreign accents as a significant risk factor which had been a key 
trigger factor in the instigation of their past victimization. Here, these participants had 
explicitly sought to avoid speaking in neutral public settings for fear of prompting similar 
incidents of targeted hostility. The corroboration of such accounts appear to exemplify just 
how physically indistinguishable these participants are from the wider population, whilst 
also highlightiŶg the sigŶifiĐaŶĐe of paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ aĐĐeŶts as the oŶlǇ ƌeal identifiably foreign 
feature upon which potential rhetoric motivated aggressors might identify targets from 
these specific groups.   
 
69 
 
Further data also indicates that the diverse demographic of the University town might also 
influence non-feaƌful paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ ĐogŶitioŶ of theiƌ ǀulŶeƌaďilitǇ to ǆeŶophoďiĐ oƌ ƌaĐist 
incidents:  
IVϭ: ͞I thiŶk the people ǁho aƌe ǁilliŶg to ďehaǀe iŶ this ǁay and commit hate crimes 
against us, they are also going to commit the same crimes against other groups too. I 
doŶ͛t thiŶk these soƌt of people disĐƌiŵiŶate eǆĐlusiǀelǇ, theǇ doŶ͛t taƌget oŶlǇ 
Romanians or Bulgarians, they will target anyone who they think is different; black 
people, Musliŵs, IŶdiaŶs, aŶǇoŶe͟ 
IVϯ: ͞You go outside of the UŶiǀeƌsitǇ ďut iŶ this paƌtiĐulaƌ aƌea theƌe aƌe a lot of 
immigrants, to be honest. So I do not think we are discriminated against for being 
migrants because there is a good ŵiǆtuƌe of Bƌitish aŶd ŵigƌaŶts heƌe. That͛s hoǁ I 
see it͟.  
IVϵ: ͞Heƌe at UŶiǀeƌsitǇ it is Ŷot a pƌoďleŵ. All the teaĐheƌs aŶd studeŶts, theƌe aƌe 
so ŵaŶǇ iŶteƌŶatioŶal studeŶts fƌoŵ aďƌoad, it is okaǇ. It͛s Ŷot happeŶiŶg heƌe. ͞ 
 
Here, the data indicates that: 
1) Participants believed that the diversity of the local population infers a prevailing tolerant 
attitude toǁaƌd Đultuƌal/ethŶiĐ diffeƌeŶĐes aŶd thus seƌǀes to alleǀiate paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ feaƌs of 
standing out and potentially being marginalized or discriminated against because of their 
foreign identity. 
2) Participants also believe that the highly diverse local demographic of the town yields an 
ample supply of more visible and easily identifiable targets for the very same individuals 
who might be otherwise inclined to target Eastern-Europeans.  
 
The data also indicates that the former (1) mitigating affect becomes further compounded 
when considered in the context and confines of the University campus, which is particularly 
notable for its immensely diverse international student demographic. Here, it was 
considered by some participants that the university, by virtue of its diverse student 
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demographic, had somehow insulated them from many of the potential issues that they 
might have otherwise experienced due to the prevalence of targeted media and political 
rhetoric. However, some participants also expressed a cautious cynicism concerning the 
issues which they believed they might encounter once they leave the University to pursue 
their careers in the wider workforce: 
IVϮ:͟ I haǀe Ŷot had aŶǇ ďad eǆpeƌieŶĐes heƌe peƌsoŶallǇ, I thiŶk it͛s ďeĐause the 
University here is so international and there are students from all over the world. So 
ŵe ďeiŶg ǁithiŶ this ĐoŶteǆt foƌ the last ϰ Ǉeaƌs gaǀe ŵe… kiŶd of hoǁ Ǉou saǇ…kept 
me isolated from any bad experiences. But I am thinking now that after I finish Uni 
aŶd get iŶto the ƌeal ǁoƌld thiŶgs ŵight ĐhaŶge͟.  
 
The data here appears to indicate something of an inverse relationship between the 
hoŵogeŶeitǇ of aŶ aƌeas͛ loĐal deŵogƌaphiĐ aŶd paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ feaƌfulŶess of Ŷaƌƌatiǀe liŶked 
harassment, whereby the more that participants feel that they stand out from the wider 
homogenous population, the more conscious they are of being singled out and targeted or 
͞otheƌed͟. Thus, despite their presence being highlighted and problematized by prominent 
media and political rhetorical narratives, the visibly diverse local demographic of the town 
aŶd its UŶiǀeƌsities͛ studeŶt ďodǇ seƌǀe to alleǀiate paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ feaƌ of ďeiŶg siŶgled out 
and possibly targeted because of their foreignness. In the context of FoC, the data indicates 
that participants feel less threatened by potential homogenous aggressors because they live 
in a highly cosmopolitan area, in which their foreignness is much more subtle when 
compared to other more physically visible groups in the area. As such, it seems that non-
feaƌful paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ assessŵeŶt of ǀulŶeƌaďilitǇ/feaƌfulŶess hiŶged upoŶ the eǆteŶt to 
which they perceived themselves to stand out from the local demographic. In the case of 
the current study, the data indicates that participants did not regard themselves as being 
highly distinguishable due to a combination of their Caucasian ethnicity and the abundance 
of ethnically distinct groups in their local area ǁho͛s gƌeateƌ distiŶguishaďilitǇ esseŶtiallǇ 
serves to further camouflage participants of the current studies foreignness. 
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4.10 UKIP: Political not criminal implications. 
It was anticipated that the growing mainstream popularity enjoyed by UKIP at the time of 
the current study would be cited by participants as a factor of significance in their increased 
eǆpeƌieŶĐe of FoC. To the ƌeseaƌĐheƌ͛s suƌpƌise, this ǁas siŵplǇ Ŷot the Đase. OŶ the 
contrary, that data indicates that participants simply did not conflate the perceived 
prominence of UKIP, the rhetoric utilized in their election campaign, or the apparent 
increased public sympathy for their rhetorical views and anti-immigration policies as being 
indicatory of an elevated level of risk to their personal safety.  
 
Similar to the accounts of their fearful and moderately concerned counterparts, a 
considerable proportion of non-feaƌful paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ aĐĐouŶts iŶdiĐated that theǇ ǁeƌe 
largely unaware and uninformed of UKIP, their apparent public popularity, their political 
views or the sort of aggravating influence that their rhetoric might have:  
IVϮ: ͞“o I do Ŷot kŶoǁ ŵuĐh aďout politiĐs iŶ geŶeƌal, eǀeŶ ‘oŵaŶiaŶ politiĐs. But 
what I know about UKIP is that they are a party that focuses on like, non-
iŵŵigƌaŶts? I doŶ͛t know if that is entirely true, but that is what I heard about them. 
They just try to.. erm, yeah, as part of their.. You know, each party has their beliefs 
and how they think society would be better, but I think that they are focusing on 
reducing immigratioŶ ďut I aŵ Ŷot ϭϬϬ% suƌe. ͞  
IVϴ: ͞I kŶoǁ that theǇ ǁaŶt to get out of the EU. To ďe hoŶest I haǀe Ŷot doŶe ŵuĐh 
ƌeseaƌĐh oŶ the eleĐtioŶ oƌ aŶǇthiŶg. “oƌƌǇ.͟  
IVϭϬ: ͞I kŶoǁ the ŵiŶiŵuŵ. I kŶoǁ that Nigel Faƌage said he ǁouldŶ͛t ǁaŶt to liǀe 
next to a Romanian neighbourhood and stuff like that. I am not up to date really. At 
the beginning I was really angry about the whole Romanian hate thing, it really 
pissed ŵe off. But Ŷoǁ I aŵ just oǀeƌ it.͟  
IVϭϮ: ͞I doŶ͛t kŶoǁ ŵuĐh. The oŶlǇ thiŶg I kŶoǁ is that UKIP aim to get out of the EU. 
Aŵ I ƌight?͟ 
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These participants were largely unaware of the nature and apparent scale of UKIP support, 
as well as the potential legitimacy that such a rhetoric driven campaign might lend to those 
who might advocate the harassment aŶd disĐƌiŵiŶatioŶ of ͞pƌoďleŵatiĐ͟ easteƌŶ-European 
migrants. For the most part, these participants were clearly unconcerned about these 
potential implications and how they might affect them. Thus, the data indicates that many 
of these participants were simply not informed or aware of this particular topic to a 
sufficient level that might warrant an assessment of its fundamental components and the 
implications these may or may not have for their personal safety, which then may or may 
not lead to rationalized FoC in this context. This would appear to constitute one explanation 
as for why these participants did not appear to elicit FoC in this regard.  
 
Notwithstanding this, even when further informed of the finer details and pushed for an 
answer in this context, these participants did not appear to conflate UKIP and their apparent 
rise in popularity among the public as being indicatory of increased personal safety fears:  
IVϳ: ͞I doŶ͛t thiŶk so [ǁoƌƌies aďout iŵpliĐatioŶs of UKIP populaƌitǇ]. I aŵ heƌe, theǇ 
ĐaŶ͛t just ŵoǀe ŵe ďaĐk aŶd I doŶ͛t thiŶk that iŶ the loŶg ƌuŶ theǇ ǁill get aŶǇ ƌesults 
ǁith this ďeĐause theǇ ǁill fiŶd out that theǇ Ŷeed iŵŵigƌaŶts foƌ soŵe joďs.͟ 
 
Other accounts suggested that participants did not equate the rising popularity of UKIP with 
an increase in potentially dangerous anti-immigrant sentiments among the general public, 
but rather that their increased popularity could be accounted for as part of wider public 
protests against the established political status quo:  
IVϰ: ͞Yes, they did well [in the EU elections] but I do not think this will be the case in 
the general election. I am interested in politics and I am always reading about it. I 
hope for the sake of your country that this is a one-time thing. I see this as a way for 
British people to penalize the other parties like the Conservatives and Labour because 
theǇ feel theǇ haǀe Ŷo otheƌ ĐhoiĐe ďut UKIP. I doŶ͛t thiŶk theǇ ǁill ǁiŶ though, Ŷo 
ǁaǇ. TheǇ ŵight Đoŵe ϰth oƌ soŵethiŶg, ďehiŶd the ŵaiŶ paƌties͟. 
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Here, the data indicates that the majority of participants did not consider the apparently 
growing popularity of UKIP to be linked with any actual increased risk to their personal 
safety. Rather, the data indicates that those participants who were and were not well 
informed on the subject mainly considered UKIP in a more benign political context. As such, 
it ǁas ĐoŶsideƌed that UKIP͛s poteŶtial politiĐal suĐĐess iŶ the GeŶeƌal EleĐtioŶ ǁould haǀe 
mainly political and institutional implications, such as visa and employment difficulties, 
rather than potentially validating and perpetuating discrimination or targeted incidents of 
harassment against themselves and their compatriots.  As such, these participants concerns 
were primarily focused on potential difficulties in gaining citizenship, work permits and the 
economic impact that Brexit might have on the UK and the wider European Union:  
IVϱ: ͞TheǇ [UKIP] ǁould pƌoďaďlǇ tƌǇ aŶd iŵpose ĐeƌtaiŶ ƌules aŶd ƌegulatioŶs iŶ 
order to stop the number of migrants coming across. But I am not entirely sure how 
that would work because the people who are here already will not be so easy to get 
ƌid of aŶd I iŵagiŶe it͛s Ŷot just EuƌopeaŶs ǁho aƌe ĐoŵiŶg oǀeƌ, theƌe aƌe otheƌ 
ŶatioŶalities too.͟ 
IVϴ: ͞If it [UKIP suppoƌt] gƌoǁs aŶd theǇ get ǁhat they want; out of the EU, then I 
think it is bad for both parties. Both sides, the UK and the EU because if you are not in 
the EU anymore then all the students and workers from the EU will have the same 
rights of internationals, so none. They will probably want to get people out of here, 
but they have to think about the fact that if we leave here, we do contribute to the 
economy because there are so many EU workers here. If they are forced to leave then 
the ĐouŶtƌǇ ǁill suffeƌ.͟  
IVϭϬ: ͞Oh Ǉes, I ƌeŵeŵďeƌ [EU elections], because I was really worried they were 
going to win and I was going to get in trouble. Well, not in trouble, but I would have 
had diffiĐulties gettiŶg ĐitizeŶship aŶd ǁoƌkiŶg heƌe iŶ the futuƌe.͟  
 
Thus, the data therefore indicates that even those non-fearful participants who were 
sufficiently knowledgeable of UKIP and their rhetoric did not consider this issue in the 
context of criminality or personal safety. These participants were not fearful of the potential 
implications that growing public popularity for such a party might entail. Further, informed 
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non-feaƌful paƌtiĐipaŶts ǁeƌe disŵissiǀe of the paƌtǇ͛s ĐhaŶĐes of peƌfoƌŵiŶg ǁell iŶ the 
General election, possibly indicating that these participants did not consider public support 
for UKIP to be at a level that would merit serious concern at a political or personal safety 
level.  
 
As such, the data therefore indicates that for non-fearful participants, the majority of whom 
had not experienced instances of harassment, the prospect of UKIP gaining mainstream 
success in the general election was negligible at best and therefore not worthy of serious 
concern. Furthermore, it would also appear that although these participants were scornful 
of UKIP and their rhetoric driven campaign, their accounts indicate that they did not equate 
their apparent rise in publicity and popularity with an increased risk or likelihood of being 
targeted because of their nationality. Rather, they understood the potential threat that UKIP 
posed towards them in a primarily political and administrational context, referring to 
potential visa and immigration difficulties, rather than fearing for the safety of themselves 
or their compatriots. As such, the data regarding the role of political rhetoric in participants 
FoC appears to indicate that non-fearful participants, whether sufficiently or insufficiently 
informed about British politics, UKIP or the nature of their rhetoric, did not consider UKIP 
and their rhetoric in the context of elevated risk to personal safety or FoC. Thus, the data 
indicates that these participants were not fearful of UKIP or the broadly anti-immigration, 
and more specifically anti-eastern-European, rhetoric that features heavily in their election 
campaign. These findings would therefore appear to dismiss the proposed link between the 
prominence of a political party such as UKIP, their rhetoric and FoC among the groups 
targeted in their rhetoric.  
 
4.11 Summary of findings 
The primary aim of this study is to investigate whether, and if, how prevalent anti-
immigration rhetoric emanating from prominent sections of mainstream media and political 
establishment affects migrants who belong to targeted groups perceptions of FoC.  
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The data presented throughout this chapter indicates that there is no clear answer to this 
question. The data strongly indicates that the primary factor of fearful participants FoC in 
this context was direct experience of harassment or discrimination that was linked to or 
pƌoŵpted ďǇ ƌespeĐtiǀe paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ ŶatioŶalitǇ aŶd the positioŶ it holds in popular 
discourse. The data indicates that these experiences prompted these participants to 
reconsider how such rhetoric and the messages they purvey might affect them in terms of 
their personal safety. This affect appeared to manifest itself in various forms and to 
different degrees, such as; 1) general concerns regarding the potential influence that such 
rhetoric may have in promoting and validating similar incidents, 2) and the tactical 
implementation of avoidance techniques intended to avoid prompting similar incidents 
from occurring by concealing their only identifiably foreign feature, their accents. As such, 
the data indicates that personal experience of such incidents, rather than media or political 
rhetoric itself, was the primary influencing factor in participants FoC and that the content of 
these experiences was what had formed their perceived link to prevailing rhetoric.  
 
The data also indicates mixed responses to UKIP, their rhetoric and their apparent rise in 
popularity. Most fearful paƌtiĐipaŶts ǀieǁed UKIP͛s aŶti-immigration rhetoric as being 
almost synonymous with the similar rhetoric of the media and therefore linked to the FoC 
they had experienced as a result of their victimization. However, some participants viewed 
UKIP primarily in administrative and bureaucratic contexts that were quite detached from 
inspiring hatred or crime.  
 
Contrary to these findings, those participants who had not had such experiences appeared 
to be far less concerned about the influence of targeted rhetoric and therefore not fearful. 
Rather, these participants, whilst scornful of the targeted nature of such rhetoric, did not 
appear to be concerned about or seriously consider that the prevalence of such rhetoric 
could have an inflammatory influence. These assessments appeared to be influenced by 
non-feaƌful paƌtiĐipaŶt͛s pƌedoŵiŶaŶtlǇ positiǀe eǆpeƌieŶĐes of liǀiŶg iŶ the UK duƌiŶg a 
period of such prominent rhetoric, whereby they did not experience harassment or 
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discrimination related to their nationality. This could be due, in part at least, to the broadly 
Caucasian physical appearances of these participants and the highly visible ethnic diversity 
of the local population representing a form camouflage from prospective aggressors. Unlike 
their fearful counterparts, the non-threatening experiences of these participants had 
evidently shaped their perceptions of the more benign influence that such rhetoric has on 
its audience. Thus, these participants did not perceive the influence this rhetoric to be of 
serious consequence to their personal safety. The data also indicate that non-fearful 
paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ assessŵeŶts of suĐh ƌhetoƌiĐ ǁeƌe also iŶflueŶĐed ďǇ the seŶse of iŶĐlusioŶ 
that they had come to feel as a result of their constructive experiences. Furthermore, 
although some non-fearful participants had previously harboured fears concerning how they 
would be accepted in the UK, these fears appeared to have been greatly alleviated by 
positive first and second-haŶd eǆpeƌieŶĐes that seƌǀed to dispel theiƌ seŶse of ͞otheƌŶess͟. 
The data also indicates that both fearful and non-fearful participants sought to attribute the 
ŵajoƌitǇ of ͞ďlaŵe͟ foƌ the ŵateƌial oŶ ǁhiĐh dispaƌagiŶg Ŷaƌƌatiǀes ǁeƌe ďased oŶ 
͞deseƌǀiŶg otheƌs͟. Heƌe, the pƌiŵaƌǇ ͞deseƌǀiŶg otheƌ͟ ǁas the ‘oŵa community whom 
many participants believed were largely responsible for their countries much maligned 
iŵage. Heƌe, the ŵajoƌitǇ of paƌtiĐipaŶts ďelieǀed that the ‘oŵa͛s estaďlished ƌeputatioŶ 
for criminality and deviance was the primary target of prevailing media and political 
rhetoric. 
 
5. Discussion of findings  
The primary purpose of this study was to develop an understanding of whether and how 
Ŷegatiǀe politiĐal aŶd ŵedia poƌtƌaǇals of ƌeĐeŶt EU ŵigƌaŶts affeĐt these iŶdiǀiduals͛ FoC. 
This ƌeseaƌĐh ĐoŶĐeŶtƌated pƌiŵaƌilǇ oŶ EasteƌŶ EuƌopeaŶ paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ peƌĐeptioŶs of 
hostile anti-immigrant rhetoric (media and political) and how these related to their 
experiences of FoC.  
 
Drawing upon the previous literature on FoC among migrant and minority groups, the 
researcher had hypothesized that migrant participants would express a heightened 
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experience of FoC due to a number of aggravating risk factors that are generally associated 
with these groups. The findings of this study appear to challenge this hypothesis by 
iŶdiĐatiŶg that the ŵajoƌitǇ of paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ were not fearful at all. This appeared to be due 
to a number of perceived risk mitigating factors. The researcher also hypothesized that the 
additional prevalence of hostile and specifically directed rhetoric would serve as an 
additioŶal aggƌaǀatiŶg ƌisk faĐtoƌ that ǁould fuƌtheƌ iŶteŶsifǇ paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐes of 
FoC. The findings appear to both support and challenge this research hypothesis by 
indicating an existing, albeit complex aŶd iŶfƌeƋueŶt, liŶk ďetǁeeŶ paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ heighteŶed 
experience of FoC and hostile rhetoric (media and political). The implications of these 
findings on the existing FoC literature will be discussed further in this chapter. 
 
A number of key findings emerged from this study regarding the fear aggravating and 
mitigating influences of numerous factors, such as English proficiency and acculturation, 
experience of identity based victimization and in/visible ethnicity. The importance of these 
findings is that they support, further contribute toward and expand upon the existing body 
of literature on ŵigƌaŶts͛ aŶd otheƌ ŵiŶoƌities͛ of experiences of FoC. In particular, these 
findings expand upon the existing body of literature by exploring the role that anti-
immigratioŶ ƌhetoƌiĐ plaǇs iŶ ŵigƌaŶts͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐes of FoC fƌoŵ the peƌspeĐtiǀes of 
students from various eastern-European countries studying in the UK. 
 
5.1 Rhetoric, victimization, vulnerability and fear of crime 
First, as anticipated the accounts of fearful participants do indicate a link between hostile 
rhetoric and the FoC they experienced. This link was directly governed by the strength of 
paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ ďelief that the pƌeǀaleŶĐe of suĐh ƌhetoƌiĐ could promote and prompt targeted 
harassment and even violence against identifiably foreign targets, such as themselves. 
These findings are similar to those of the ICAR study (2004) and provide further support for 
the hypothesis that unbalanced and disconcerting media reports of migrants, refugees and 
asylum seekers, can lead to some members of these groups experiencing related FoC. 
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However, these findings also indicate that although most participants were both aware and 
cautious of the influence of such rhetoric, the vast majority of participants were not fearful. 
This finding might indicate that the fear inducing influence of such rhetoric alone may not 
be as severe or pervasive as previously thought (ICAR, 2004; Fƌost, ϮϬϬϳ; O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϭϬͿ.  
 
Further, as previously noted, the findings of this study also indicate that the rhetoric-FoC 
nexus is one which consists of and is influenced by a range of mitigating and aggravating 
factors. The findings here indicate that, even within an environment where such rhetoric is 
prevalent, the most significant fear aggravating factor in this nexus was the first-hand 
experience of certain kinds of victimization which was perceived by victims to be directly 
linked to their foreign identity and the disparaged position it holds within some sections of 
public discourse. This finding reflects those of previous studies which have also found that 
criminal victimization experience, both violent and verbal, appears to increase FoC among 
affected migrant participants (Yun, Kercher & Swindell, 2010). As such, the findings of this 
study appear to simultaneously support the explanatory validity of both the victimization 
and vulnerability models for FoC (Box, Hale and Andrews, 1988; Hale, 1996; Yun, Kercher & 
Swindell, 2010) by indicating that experiences of specific forms of victimization informed the 
ǀiĐtiŵs͛ peƌĐeptioŶs of theiƌ ǀulŶeƌaďilitǇ to siŵilaƌ iŶĐideŶts ǁhiĐh iŶ tuƌŶ iŶfoƌŵed theiƌ 
experiences of FoC and subsequent self-preservation responses.  
 
Furthermore, the findings of this study also add to those of the ICAR study (2004) by 
providing a more nuanced and in-depth appreciation of the factors that can mitigate and 
aggravate rhetoric linked FoC among members of targeted migrant groups. Here, rather 
than being a linear process of cause and effect, the findings indicate that experience of 
ƌhetoƌiĐ liŶked FoC is pƌiŵaƌilǇ goǀeƌŶed ďǇ paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ liǀed eǆpeƌieŶĐes of ǀiĐtiŵizatioŶ 
which contained certain reference cues that clearly reflected the disparaging content of 
media and political rhetoric. This serves to communicate to the victim that it is their 
foreignness and the position it holds within wider public discourse that is the primary 
aggravating factor in their victimization. This suggests that paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ FoC ǁas Ŷot a diƌeĐt 
response to rhetoric alone but rather an evasive response to direct experiences of 
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victimization, the content of which they believed confirmed the aggravating influence that 
rhetoric can have its audiences and how this influence can present itself as a genuine threat 
throughout their day-to-day lives. This finding also appears to underline the fear inducing 
power of first-haŶd ǀiĐtiŵizatioŶ aŶd hoǁ suĐh eǆpeƌieŶĐes ĐaŶ also iŶfoƌŵ ǀiĐtiŵs͛ 
perceptions of vulnerability to specific threats (Box, Hale and Andrews, 1988; Hale, 1996; 
Pantazis, 2000; Alper and Chappell, 2012). This also provides an interesting insight into how 
the speĐifiĐ ĐoŶteŶt of ǀiĐtiŵs͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐes ĐaŶ also iŶfoƌŵ the ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh theǇ pƌoĐess 
and rationalize their perceived vulnerability to such crimes, as well as the level of risk that 
they associate with their foreignness in the wider context of rhetoric. Thus, these findings 
therefore appear to support the position that hostile and unbalanced reporting of 
immigration can both cause members of targeted groups to experience FoC (ICAR, 2004), 
facilitate racism against members of targeted groups and influence the tone that such 
iŶĐideŶts ĐaŶ take ;Fƌost, ϮϬϬϳ; O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϭϬͿ, ǁhiĐh ĐaŶ fuƌtheƌ shape the ǁaǇ in which 
victims interpret and rationalize their perceived vulnerability and subsequent FoC.  
 
AŶotheƌ keǇ fiŶdiŶg ǁas that soŵe ǀiĐtiŵized paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐes had led theŵ to 
actively hide their foreign identity in certain public settings. These measures included 
avoiding speaking in public and avoiding disclosing their nationality to strangers. These 
participants felt that within the current climate that indicators of their foreign identity, in 
particular their accents, could very possibly trigger repeat victimization if recognized by 
active rhetoric subscribers. This might be interpreted as supporting the position of some 
(Levin & McDevitt, 1992; Craig, 2002; Gerstenfeld, 2004; Perry, 2010; Harek, Cogan & Gillis, 
2002) that victims of hate motivated crimes suffer from greater psychological trauma than 
victims of non-hate related crime because the victimization experienced by these individuals 
are fundamentally attacks upon a central component of their identity. As a result, some of 
these victimized participants felt compelled to hide indicators of their foreign identity in 
public out of fear of triggering repeat incidents of aggression, harassment or violence. This, 
however, was not the case for all participants, most of whom were not fearful and had not 
experienced victimization that could be interpreted as being linked to rhetoric and their 
foreign identity. These contrasting findings might be interpreted as an indication of just how 
significant a factor the Caucasian ethnicity of these participants was in protecting the 
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majority of them from more prevalent and pronounced instances of discrimination and 
harassment, as well as the subsequent impact that such instances might have on 
paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ peƌĐeptioŶs of ǀulŶeƌaďilitǇ aŶd FoC. As suĐh, the fiŶdings of previous research 
(Benia, Janchevic & Hastigs, 2008; Chongatera, 2013), which indicates that visible ethnicity is 
the most significant factor in the experience of and subsequent fear of hate crimes may 
offer some explanation as to; 1) why so few participants had been victimized because of 
their foreign identity, 2) why the majority of participants were not fearful and 3) why only 
participants with experience of victimization were fearful despite the prevalence of media 
and political rhetoric.  
5.2 Inexperience of victimization, fear of crime and hidden 
ethnic identity.  
“eĐoŶdlǇ, ǁhile the fiŶdiŶgs iŶdiĐate that although ƌhetoƌiĐ is liŶked to soŵe paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ 
FoC, the majority of participants in this study were not fearful of rhetoric related crime or 
crime in general. A number of mitigating factors are discussed here; in particular, these 
paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ iŶeǆpeƌieŶĐe of ƌhetoƌiĐ liŶked ǀiĐtiŵizatioŶ. This fiŶdiŶg appeaƌs to fuƌtheƌ 
support the mutual explanatory validity of the victimisation and vulnerability models of FoC 
by indicating a link between experiences of victimization and perceived vulnerability to 
rhetoric linked crime.  As with the ICAR (2004) study, the majority of participants were 
aware of the prevalence and hostile nature of rhetoric, with many even acknowledging its 
potential to aggravate discriminatory views toward targeted migrant groups from some the 
sections of the wider public. However, the findings indicate that it was these participants 
inexperience of rhetoric linked inferential victimization that is the primary mitigating factor 
in their non-fearfulness. This finding, compounded by the fact that the majority of 
participants had not experienced such incidents and were not fearful of rhetoric linked 
crime, might be explained and interpreted in a number of ways.  
 
Firstly, this might indicate that that both the inflammatory and fear inducing influence of 
anti-immigration rhetoric is not as pervasive in nature or as influential in the emergence of 
hostile attitudes as some might suggest ;ICA‘, ϮϬϬϰ; Fƌost, ϮϬϬϳ; O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϭϬͿ. This ŵaǇ 
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go some way to explaining why, despite the prevalence of such targeted rhetoric, the 
majority of participants had never experienced victimization that could provoke genuine 
fears regarding the inflammatory influence of rhetoric and the perceived risk of similar 
victimization in the future.  
 
Secondly, this might also be indicative of significant differences between the student 
migrant status of participants in the current study and the refugee/asylum participants in 
the ICAR study (2004). Fundamentally, the participants in this study were students who had 
knowingly chosen the UK as a place to live, study and potentially pursue future career paths, 
whereas those surveyed in the ICAR study (2004) were refugees and asylum seekers who 
are typically forced to flee their countries of origin from various forms of political, ethnic 
and religious persecution. The contrasting past experiences of these two significantly 
different groups of participants could indicate that, as members of particularly vulnerable 
groups, refugees and asylum seekers are more sensitive to the targeted nature of media and 
political rhetoric because they are likely to have already experienced the kinds of 
discrimination and persecution that the narratives contained in such rhetoric might be 
perceived as being indicative of. As such, these factors might go some way in explaining the 
contrasting perceptions of participants in these two studies and could form the focus of 
future research into varying perceptions of FoC among groups of migrants, asylum seekers 
and refugees.   
 
Thirdly, previous research has also indicated that ethnicity is a key indicator of social, 
educational and discriminatory disadvantage factors which can contribute toward minority 
gƌoups͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐes of ǀiĐtiŵizatioŶ aŶd theiƌ suďseƋueŶt peƌĐeptioŶ of ǀulŶeƌaďilitǇ aŶd 
risk (Pager and Shepherd, 2008; Wu and Altheimer, 2013). As such, findings of this study 
may also be indicative of the importance of the visible ethnic identity of groups that are the 
targets of rhetoric, how this particular factor might serve to regulate the actual occurrence 
and perceived likelihood of victimization, as well as how these factors influence the 
development of FoC. All participants in this study were Caucasian Eastern-Europeans who 
were living within an ethnically diverse area of the UK. Here, some of these participants 
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believed that the covert nature of their ethnicity, in conjunction with the ethnic diversity of 
the local area, may have served to shield them from more overt forms of racially motivated 
hostility and victimization, whilst fearful victimized participants felt that their only 
discernibly foreign feature, their accents, had been the primary trigger for their experiences 
of racially or rhetoric motivated victimization. These findings appear to indicate the 
perceived risk significance that migrants and other minority groups may attribute to their 
identifiably foreign features such as their ethnicity, foreign accent or even signs of religious 
affiliation. Such findings and the proposed explanation also appear to be consistent with 
those of previous studies in which visible ethnicity was found to be a significant factor in 
both experience of and fear of hate crimes (Benia, Janhevich & Hastings, 2008; Chongatera, 
2013). Furthermore, within such an ethnically diverse environment, the distinguishable 
foreignness of white European migrants is likely to be far less apparent than that of other 
visible ethnic groups that reside within the same area. Here, some participants believed that 
although rhetoric had been heavily focused upon new EU migrants (Romanians, Bulgarians 
and Poles), the more visibly distinct targets of previous hostile rhetoric, such as Muslims and 
African refugees and asylum seekers, were far more likely to be targeted than themselves 
due of the protection that their Caucasian ethnicity afforded them. Thus, the findings 
indicate that the main reason why most participants in the current study were not fearful of 
rhetoric linked victimization is likely due to the absence of a number of factors that are 
governed and mitigated by the concealed nature of their foreignness and the protection 
that this affords them in various regards. As such, an optimistic reading of these findings 
appears to underline the significance of race and ethnicity as both mitigating and 
aggravating factors in the experience of identity related targeted victimization, perceived 
attribution of risk to identifiably foreign features and the effect that these factors may have 
upon experiences of FoC among distinct and indistinct ethnic minorities and migrants.     
 
Previous literature (Furr, Austin, Cribbs & Smogger, 2010) has also suggested that the family 
moving process and residence of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees may serve to 
ŵitigate ƌisk faĐtoƌs that aƌe tǇpiĐallǇ assoĐiated ǁith ŵigƌatioŶ aŶd ŵigƌaŶts͛ suďseƋueŶt 
experiences of FoC. Although the participants of this study had not migrated or lived in 
family units per se, as students they are likely to be living in shared accommodation with 
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groups of friends. Such student living arrangements might serve to duplicate the fear 
mitigating influence that is proposed by Furr et al (2006) to explain unexpected high safety 
assessments reported by their former USSR refugee participants. However, in Babacan et 
al͛s ;ϮϬϭϬͿ studǇ of ChiŶese studeŶts iŶ MelďouƌŶe, paƌtiĐipaŶts Ŷot oŶlǇ ƌepoƌted high 
perceptions of FoC, but also high levels of victimization, with many perceiving overt racism 
as a being a key factor in their experiences. As such, these findings, in combination with 
those of the ĐuƌƌeŶt studǇ aŶd Fuƌƌ et al͛s ;ϮϬϬϲͿ appeaƌ to fuƌtheƌ iŶdiĐate the sigŶifiĐaŶĐe 
of visible ethnicity as an aggravating factor in the perceived allocation of risk to identity 
factors, experiences of victimization and subsequent experience of FoC and fear of hate 
crime among members of distinct ethnic minority groups within predominantly white 
societies. 
5.3 Identity: Detachment from and deflection of rhetoric 
AŶotheƌ fiŶdiŶg ǁas that a ĐoŶsideƌaďle Ŷuŵďeƌ of ‘oŵaŶiaŶ paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ aĐĐouŶts 
appeared to indicate that they were, to some extent, able to detach themselves from the 
rhetoric based stigma that had come to broadly represent their nationality. Here, some 
participants, whist accepting the limited legitimacy of such claims, sought to transfer the 
unfavourable scope of rhetoric away from their self-identified group, ethnic Romanians, 
onto the Roma ethnic minority with whom they are often broadly associated. This finding 
both reflects and further supports the findings of previous research concerning strategies 
used by Romanians to cope with their stigmatized status (Morosanu and Fox, 2013). Here 
participants in both studies sought to draw a clear distinction between their group, ethnic 
Romanians, and the Roma, by pointing out a number of significant cultural, behavioural and 
ethnic differences in order to clearly exemplify this distinction. A number of participants in 
both studies had also personally experienced numerous unwelcome conflations between 
themselves, as Romanian nationals, and the Roma during and throughout their interactions 
with indigenous individuals who were unaware of the distinction between the two groups.  
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These findings further indicate the possible significance of visibly distinct ethnicity and the 
status ǀoid that still eǆists ďetǁeeŶ ͞ǁhiteŶess͟ aŶd ͞ďlaĐkŶess͟ ǁithiŶ pƌedoŵiŶaŶtlǇ 
white European societies and may also indicate the significance of class. Here, it could be 
possible that these factors may serve to mitigate the perceived vulnerability of Caucasian 
Romanian participants because of the position of relative privilege that their whiteness is 
consciously or subconsciously perceived to afford them. This, in conjunction with way in 
which their Caucasian ethnicity conceals their physical foreignness, may go some way to 
explaining, A) unexpectedly low FoC among participants, B) the low level of significance that 
participants associated with sensationalist rhetoric, and C) the majoritǇ of paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ 
inexperience of identity linked victimization.  
 
5.4 Adaptability mitigating rhetoric-fear link 
The findings of the current study also appear to support the hypothesis that those with 
better adopted language skills are less likely to experience FoC due to the increase 
acculturation this affords them (Sundeen, 1984; Ackah, 2000; Brown & Bennedict, 2004; Lee 
& Ulmer, 2000; Wu & Wen, 2014). Here, the accounts of some non-fearful participants 
indicated that their ability to quickly adapt to the culture, customs and language of the UK 
had been a major mitigating factors in how they were affected by disparaging rhetoric and 
their subsequent perceptions of vulnerability and FoC within this context. These factors may 
also go some way to explaining the unexpected findings of the current study. Firstly, 
adopted language proficiency has been suggested by some (Wu & Wen, 2014) to be one of 
the most significant factors in migrant acculturation, whereby migrants who are proficient in 
the language of their adoptive country are able to more easily interact within and adapt to 
the culture and customs of their adoptive society, than those who are less proficient. As EU 
students studying degrees that are taught in English, the participants of the current study 
were all required to attain and demonstrate a certain level of English proficiency before 
they were accepted onto their respective degrees. Thus, it is therefore possible that the 
participants of the current study had generally attained a level of English proficiency that 
exceeds that of other migrants whose residence is not dependent on their attainment and 
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demonstration of adoptive language proficiency. As such, it might be the case that the 
higher English proficiency levels of participants in the current study may afford them a 
greater degree of acculturation compared to non-student migrants, which may go some way 
to explaining participants unexpectedly low FoC. One, therefore, might speculate that the 
subsequently greater acculturation of student participants in the current study exceed those 
of the average economic migrant, refugee or asylum seeker, whose residency is not subject 
to their language attainment and who have been found to be both more fearful of rhetoric 
linked crime (ICAR, 2004) and crime in general (Akah, 2000; Eitle & Taylor, 2008; Mears and 
“teǁaƌt, ϮϬϭϬ; PaiŶ, ϮϬϬϭ; O͛NioŶs, ϮϬϭϬͿ.  
 
5.5 Summary of discussion 
This chapter has discussed the main findings of this study in relation to the existing body of 
relevant literature concerning FoC and FoC among migrant and minority groups. Firstly, the 
findings of this study both support and challenge the hypothesis that anti-immigration 
rhetoric (media and political) is linked to the experience of FoC and heightened perceptions 
of vulnerability among members of the migrant groups they target. Here, the supporting 
findings indicate that in some cases rhetoric was linked to some participants FoC, however, 
this link is not linear and appears to be subject to specific trigger factors, which came in the 
form of various types of victimization, that communicate this link to the victim. As such, the 
findings here appear to highlight the significance of first-hand victimization as a key cause of 
FoC and as a means of communicating perceptions of the aggravating influence of rhetoric 
sources. Furthermore, the accounts of victimized and fearful participants do appear to 
iŶdiĐate a peƌĐeiǀed liŶk ďetǁeeŶ theiƌ feaƌ aŶd ͚less sophistiĐated oƌ pƌiǀileged͛ gƌoups of 
society.  
 
The findings of this study also appear to indicate the significance of various protective and 
ŵitigatiŶg faĐtoƌs that ŵight eǆplaiŶ the ŵajoƌitǇ of paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ iŶeǆpeƌieŶĐe of 
victimization and non-fearfulness. Here, the findings indicate the potential significance of 
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Eastern-European partiĐipaŶts͛ CauĐasiaŶ ethŶiĐitǇ as a pƌoteĐtiǀe faĐtoƌ fƌoŵ ideŶtitǇ 
based victimization and the proposed fear inducing and rhetoric inferring implications of 
such incidents. The findings also suggest the importance of factors that relate to the specific 
status of newcomers (migrant, refugee, asylum seeker) and how the current (living 
arrangements) and past circumstances (experience of persecution) of members of these 
groups might serve to mitigate or aggravate perceptions of the crime aggravating influence 
of rhetoric sources and subsequent experience of linked FoC. Furthermore, the findings here 
also indicate that acculturation factors, such as higher English proficiency and increased 
iŶtegƌatioŶ, ŵight seƌǀe to ŵitigate ŵigƌaŶts͛ ƌhetoƌiĐ liŶked feaƌs aŶd perceptions of 
vulnerability. Finally, the findings also indicate the way in which participants perceived 
themselves in relation to the scope of anti-immigration rhetoric may also serve to mitigate 
its impact. Here, the findings indicate that many participants were able to detach 
themselves from the broadly problematizing scope of rhetoric and even in some cases 
deflect it onto legitimate others, the Roma. This finding also appears to further indicate the 
significance of ethnicity and possibly even class as key elements in the rhetoric-FoC nexus. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study set out to assess and explore the potential impact that mounting anti-migrant 
rhetoric, from within mainstream media and political discourse, has on members of 
taƌgeted ŵigƌaŶt gƌoups͛ peƌĐeptions of FoC. The current study consisted of twelve in-
depth, semi-structured interviews with eastern-European student participants. The data 
from these interviews was then examined through employing thematic analysis of 
commonly recurring and significant theŵes that eŵeƌged fƌoŵ paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ aĐĐouŶts iŶ 
order to provide a framework for understanding whether and how anti-immigrant rhetoric 
interacts with and informs members of targeted migrant groups FoC. The findings derived 
from this process indicate a variety of consistencies and inconsistencies with the previous 
literature that has investigated FoC and perceptions of vulnerability among other migrant 
and minority groups.  
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Previous literature has consistently found that migrant and minority groups experience FoC 
to a greater extent than the general population in which they live. Based upon these 
findings, in combination with the apparent significance of anti-immigration rhetoric, the 
researcher has predicted that participants would report experiencing high levels of FoC. 
However, contrary to the existent literature, this study found that the majority of 
participants were not experiencing FoC and were not fearful of the inflammatory nature and 
potential influence of rhetoric. The findings indicate that the most significant factor in these 
participants FoC was that the majority had no experience of harassment or victimization 
that was motivated by or perceived to be linked to their foreign identity. Here, a number of 
mitigating factors associated with these paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ ƌisk of ideŶtitǇ ďased Đƌiŵe eŵeƌged. 
Consistent with the findings of previous hate crime studies, the Caucasian ethnicity of the 
ŵajoƌitǇ of paƌtiĐipaŶts ǁas ideŶtified as ďeiŶg a keǇ to ĐoŶĐealiŶg these paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ 
foreign identity from potential rhetoric or identity motivated assailants. Furthermore, it is 
also considered that within the context of the local ethnically diverse demographic, these 
participants indistinct foreignness is further concealed and normalized. Also consistent with 
pƌeǀious ŵigƌaŶt FoC liteƌatuƌe, the eleǀated EŶglish pƌofiĐieŶĐǇ of this studies͛ paƌtiĐipaŶts 
is also hypothesized to mitigate a range of factors, which are typically associated with 
migrants FoC, by affording them a greater capability to better interact and integrate into the 
Đultuƌe aŶd Đustoŵs of theiƌ adoptiǀe soĐietǇ. This studǇ also fouŶd that paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ aďilitǇ 
to detach themselves from the scope of anti-immigration rhetoric by asserting their prestige 
compared to the genuine undesirable and haďituallǇ deǀiaŶt ͞otheƌs͟ ;‘oŵaͿ ǁhoŵ ǁeƌe 
perceived to be the intended targets of such disparagement.  
 
Although the majority of participants were not fearful, a small minority of participants were. 
In most of these cases, the fear experienced by these participants had been prompted by 
their experiences of victimization or harassment, which had been triggered by the discovery 
of paƌtiĐipaŶts͛ foƌeigŶ ideŶtitǇ by their accents. As such, these participants explicitly sought 
to conceal their foreignness by hiding their accents in public. Here, the findings indicate that 
it is the specific content and locations of these experiences were instrumental in shaping 
fearful participants perceptions of the genuine inflammatory influence of rhetoric, 
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archetypes of likely perpetrators of rhetoric motivated crime or harassment and where the 
risks of such experiences are most pronounced. The inference and perceived confirmation 
of these risk factors appear to be significant in the development and experience of these 
participants FoC. As such, the findings of the current study indicate that link between these 
participants FoC and anti-immigration rhetoric was secondary and therefore not directly 
linked to the circulation of anti-immigration rhetoric.  
 
To conclude, although previous studies and literature have presented the sensationalist 
rhetoric and anti-immigration narratives (media and political) as a genuine source of FoC, 
the findings of this study challenge the linearity of this proposed connection. Rather than 
been simple case of cause and effect, the findings of this study indicate the significance of 
iŶdiǀiduals͛ liǀed eǆpeƌieŶĐes of ideŶtitǇ ŵotiǀated ǀiĐtiŵizatioŶ aŶd adoptiǀe Đultuƌal 
integration in FoC-rhetoric nexus. Furthermore, the findings of this study also indicate the 
iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of faĐtoƌs suĐh as iŶdiǀiduals͛ ǀisiďle ethŶiĐitǇ aŶd the ethŶiĐ diǀeƌsitǇ of the 
local area, as factors that might serve to aggravate or mitigate the risk of experiencing 
identity based victimization. The findings also support that ŵigƌaŶts͛ EŶglish pƌofiĐieŶĐǇ aŶd 
subsequent acculturation levels can also serve to mitigate a range of FoC factors.  
 
6.1 Limitations of the study 
As with other studies, the current study has a number of limitations that are anchored in its 
methodological approach. Firstly, using a small, purposive sample significantly limits the 
generalizability of the results and findings of the current study. Further, the student status 
of the participants of the current study is also likely to further limit the generalizability of 
these findings. This might be due to differences in social, financial and adaptive factors of 
student and non-student migrants and how these factors might influence experiences of 
victimization, perceived vulnerability and FoC. However, although most existing research 
into FoC among migrant and minority groups have been quantitative and therefore relied on 
much larger scale samples, the methodological structure of these studies mean they are 
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more limited to testing the validity of theory and significance of factors rather than 
exploring and generating new understandings of complex social phenomena, as has been 
attempted by the current study. This notwithstanding, the final sample of the current study 
(ten Romanian, one Polish and one Bulgarian participant) means that the findings of this 
study are, 1) more representative of the experiences of Romanian migrants than Eastern 
European migrants in general and 2) possibly unrepresentative of non-student migrants due 
to the likely differences in the social, educational and discriminatory factors that shape and 
influence the experiences and perceptions of student and non-student migrants alike.  
 
Second, the qualitative nature of the current study entails a number of limitations in itself. 
The nature of qualitative enquiry being what it is, the risk of researcher error and bias is 
increased and can be hard to avoid given the intimate position of the researcher in relation 
to the interview process, data analysis, discussion and interpretation of findings. Further, 
given that the data analysis and interpretation processes of qualitative research are heavily 
dependent of the interpretation of the researcher, the findings of the current study might 
be viewed as being too subjective. Thus, it is entirely possible that the findings of this study 
ŵaǇ Ŷot ďe eŶtiƌelǇ ǀalid due to ƌeseaƌĐheƌ iŶteƌfeƌeŶĐe, despite the ƌeseaƌĐheƌs͛ ďest 
efforts.  
 
6.2 Possibilities for future research 
A number of possibilities for future research might also be derived from the findings and 
inconsistencies with previous literature that are presented within the current study. First, 
elevated English proficiency is proposed to serve to increase acculturation levels and reduce 
FoC among migrants. It is suggested that because the student migrant participants of the 
current study had already attained higher levels of English proficiency than might be the 
case for non-student migrants, these participants are likely to also have higher acculturation 
rates than their non-student counterparts, which may explain lower than expected 
experiences of FoC in relation to rhetoric and crime in general. Here, future studies might 
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benefit from further testing the fear mitigating significance of English proficiency and 
subsequent acculturation levels among a sample of non-student eastern-European migrants 
or even conducting comparative studies between student and non-student migrants.  
 
Second, based upon the accounts of participants, the subsequent findings and their contrast 
with previous literature, the current study suggests that ethnicity could also be a significant 
factor in mitigating both general FoC and rhetoric linked FoC among migrants. Previous 
research has also shown that ethnicity is linked to various social, economic, discriminatory 
and victimization factors that can have the power to shape life experiences and perceptions 
of crime. Here, it might be the case that these factors serve to mitigate white Eastern 
EuƌopeaŶs͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐes of ǀiĐtiŵizatioŶ aŶd theiƌ suďseƋueŶt peƌĐeptioŶs of FoC. As suĐh, 
future research might benefit from further exploring whether ethnically distinct migrants 
experience greater general FoC and rhetoric linked FoC than migrants who are more 
ethnically indistinguishable from the indigenous population.  
 
Third, contrary to the limited body of literature on effects of media representation and 
refugee/asylum seekers perceptions of safety, the findings of the current study indicate that 
hostile media and political rhetoric were not significant in most student migrant participants 
FoC or perceptions of vulnerability. These contrasting findings might be explained by the 
contrasting nature, experiences and circumstances of migrant student participants in the 
current study and refugee/asylum seeker participants in the ICAR study (2004). Future 
research might benefit from exploring whether vulnerability factors which are more 
commonly associated with or prevalent amongst vulnerable minority groups, such as 
refugees and asylum seekers, influence the significance that these groups attribute to 
hostile political and media rhetoric, and how these factors influence their FoC.  
 
Fourth, specific forms of victimization and harassment were found to be the primary trigger 
of participants FoC that was linked to media and political rhetoric. Only when such incidents 
had occurred did participants appear to seriously consider the potential of such rhetoric to 
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incite xeno-motivated crime. The current study proposes that this indicates that experience 
of hate crime is significant in FoC and how victims attribute vulnerability factors, such as 
their accents, to likelihood of future victimization. Here, future research might benefit from 
further investigating this hypothesis and appraising its validity by conducting rhetoric based 
FoC research among a sample of previous hate crime victims. 
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8. Appendices  
Interview guide for Semi-structured interviews 
 
How do media and political anti-iŵŵigƌatioŶ ƌhetoƌiĐ affeĐt ƌeĐeŶt EU ŵigƌaŶts͛ eǆpeƌieŶĐes 
of FoC?  
 
Impressions of the media 
 
1) First of all, I would like to ask you about your impressions of the media in this country?  
2) Now I would like us to discuss the manner in which some prominent media sources depict 
migrants, such as yourself? 
  
A) How do you feel when you see/hear about these stories?  
B) Why do you think they do this? 
C) What kind of effect do you think these kinds of stories will have on their readers?  
 
Views on political rhetoric 
 
1) Here, I would like us to talk about UKIP and their place in UK politics.  
A) What are your impressions of UKIP?  
B) What aƌe Ǉouƌ thoughts oŶ UKIP͛s uŶaŶtiĐipated suĐĐess at the EU paƌliaŵeŶtaƌǇ 
elections?  
C) UKIP appear to be a growing force in UK politics, this might suggest that their 
views are shared by a growing number of the population, what are your thoughts 
on this?  
D) Could you give me your views on the kinds of people who you believe UKIP are 
most likely to appeal to and why?  
Impressions and experiences of discrimination 
 
1) Before you moved to the UK, did you have any worries/fears about experiencing 
discrimination here?  
B) And after spending some time here, how do you feel you have been received by 
people? (If you had any fears, do you think they were realized?) 
2) If you have/were treated in a discriminatory manner (verbally or physically) how 
would/did you deal with this?  
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3) Do you worry about discrimination more/less in different places, if so where and why?  
 
 
